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Essays In Online News Consumption
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the impact of the consumption environment on consumer preferences and
decision making in consuming online news. The two chapters explore the effects of variation in the
consumption environment in two different ways: offline, via differences in environmental factors, and
online, via news-delivery platform changes.
The first chapter addresses whether the offline news environment affects online news consumption
choices, focusing on whether consumers are more influenced by their innate preferences or outside
environments when choosing to consume news - do consumers trade off online and offline news
consumption? We build and estimate a model extending the standard discrete choice framework that
allows us to identify this relationship via recovery of a single structural parameter. This parameter
interprets the relationship between inside goods (online news) and the outside option (offline
environmental news options). To estimate our model, we take advantage of a large novel data set of a
subset of US users from a major web browser. We exploit the migration patterns of users as our source of
identifying variation. In particular, we analyze consumer browsing before and after a move to identify our
model. This exercise leads to evidence of independence between online and offline news goods at the
population level, suggesting minimal offline environmental influence. However, further investigation points
to significant between-individual heterogeneity in the relationship between online and offline news, which
we then show is partially explained by observable consumer characteristics via machine learning
methods. We explore the implications of this heterogeneity and propose additional analysis to identify the
potential mechanisms behind our findings.
In the second chapter, we examine a change in the Facebook algorithm and its impact on online news
browsing. We ask the question whether social media increases or decreases online news consumption,
specifically of opinion-oriented content. The key to our identification of this impact is a change in the
Facebook news algorithm that occurred over the first few months of 2018. Facebook deprioritized
content that a users' connections did not interact with, resulting in a large reduction in news consumption.
We employ a matching design wherein we match treatment users who use Facebook - and thus are
affected by changes in the Facebook algorithm - to those who do not use Facebook using characteristics
of these users' browsing habits. When news content is reduced on Facebook, we see a drop in news
browsing behavior for these users relative to their peers who do not use Facebook, suggesting that social
media use does increase news consumption as users do not merely substitute to other media. However,
we also observe that compared to control users, our treatment users experience an increase in opinionoriented content browsing when their access to social media news is reduced. This runs counter to our
original speculation that social media would be correlated with increased opinion-oriented media
consumption. We hypothesize potential mechanisms for these effects and propose tests to distinguish
them. Overall, we see evidence consistent with online consumption environments having impact on
consumption decisions, with much less impact coming from offline consumption environments
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN ONLINE NEWS CONSUMPTION
Michael Kurish
Aviv Nevo
Pinar Yildirim
This thesis focuses on the impact of the consumption environment on consumer preferences
and decision making when consuming online news. The two chapters explore the effects of
variation in the consumption environment in two different ways: offline, via differences in
environmental factors, and online, via news-delivery platform changes.
The first chapter looks at the offline news environment focusing on whether news consumers
are more influenced by their innate preferences or outside environments. We build and estimate a model extending the standard discrete choice framework that allows us to identify
this relationship. To estimate our model, we take advantage of a large novel data set of a
subset of US users from a major web browser. We exploit the migration patterns of users as
our source of identifying variation. This exercise leads to evidence of independence between
online and offline news goods at the population level, suggesting minimal offline environmental influence. However, further investigation points to significant between-individual
heterogeneity. We explore the implications of this heterogeneity and propose additional
analysis to identify the potential mechanisms behind our findings.
In the second chapter, we ask the question whether social media increases or decreases online
news consumption, specifically of opinion-oriented content. The key to our identification
of this impact is a change in the Facebook news algorithm that occurred over the first
few months of 2018, resulting in a large reduction in news consumption. We employ a
matching design wherein we match treatment users who use Facebook to those who do
not use Facebook using characteristics of these users’ browsing habits. Our results suggest
v

that social media use does increase news consumption. However, we also observe that
compared to control users, our treatment users experience an increase in opinion-oriented
content browsing when their access to social media news is reduced. Overall, we see evidence
consistent with online consumption environments having impact on consumption decisions,
with much less impact coming from offline consumption environments.
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CHAPTER 1
Does the Offline Environment Impact Online News Browsing:
Evidence from Migration

Michael Kurish and Markus Mobius

1.1. Introduction
There are large geographical differences in how individuals engage with the internet (Looker
(2010)). As more news consumption moves online, (Geiger (2019)) such differences in online
behavior translate to varying levels of engagement with online news. It is unclear, however, if
this variation in how internet users choose to consume news stems from disparate consumer
preferences across geographies, or rather from differing characteristics of the supply of offline
news options in the local media environment. Do consumers around the country merely have
different preferences over how to consume news, or does the offline news environment itself
impact how they choose to consume news online?
This question ultimately hinges on the precise nature of the relationship between online
and offline media. If the options available in the offline media environment are to impact
online choices, there must be a relationship between online and offline news from the point
of view of the consumer. Online news could be a substitute for print or TV media, so an
offline environment poor in these news sources would cause consumers to instead get news
online. Alternatively, reading online news could be complementary to offline face-to-face
interactions with friends and coworkers, so environments richer in social sources of news
discussion would yield more online news consumption. Last, it is possible that there is
no relationship between online and offline sources of news, and the goods are independent.
Existing research provides somewhat contradictory views on what this relationship may be.
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Finding evidence of both substitution and complementarity (Kaiser and Kongsted (2005),
Gentzkow (2007), Goldfarb and Tucker (2011), Sridhar and Sriram (2015), Ha and Zhang
(2017)), past studies leave the exact relationship between online and offline news sources an
open question.
In this paper, we measure the impact of the political character of the offline environment on
consumer online partisan news browsing behavior. We narrow our focus to partisanship as
this characteristic of the local environment provides us with a single quantitative index by
which consumer preference can be compared with environmental supply. By assuming that a
liberal prefers to browse liberal-leaning news and that there is relatively more liberal-leaning
news in liberal-leaning environments, we have a metric by which the supply of news in a
consumer’s local environment can be measured relative to that consumer’s news preferences.
In order to observe consumer behavior, we use a novel data set comprising a subset of users
from a large web browser. The key feature of our data is that it allows us to observe a
consumer’s physical location. We detect movement of our users between offline locations as
our source of identifying environmental variation. Assuming internet partisan news outlets
are unchanging, this approach allows us to isolate the relationship between online news
browsing and the offline news options that we expect to change in the local environment.
Importantly, when considering these local environmental news options, we allow that they
may be either formal sources (such as local television, newspapers, or talk radio) or informal
sources (in-person communication) of news. We approach the problem flexibly, as our model
allows for substitution, complementarity, or even complete independence of online and offline
news channels in the choices of consumers.
In our data, users are identified via a unique anonymous ID that allows us to track them
over time. We are able to observe a user’s timestamped URL requests, which give us a total
picture of a user’s browsing activity when using the browser. Importantly, a user’s location
can be observed in the data via a reverse-IP lookup allowing us to identify the location in
which the browsing activity occurs. We use these latter data to identify movers, which we
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define as individuals who are browsing in two different Designated Market Areas1 (DMAs)
within the United States in the two time periods we use for our data, February 2017 and
February 2018. Thus, we have both a before and an after picture of browsing behavior which
takes place in two different offline environments.
In order to use these data to identify the relationship between online and offline sources
of news, our identification strategy can be thought of as comprising three parts. First, we
determine a user’s political preference from her online browsing, and then use that known
preference to determine if her move yields a more- or less-favorably partisan local environment. Then, we observe the resulting change in her online news browsing to determine the
relationship between the online and offline goods. To formalize this strategy, we build and
estimate a model of online political news browsing. We model the choice problem consumers
face between various online news options and an offline outside option. Our innovation that
allows this identification strategy to be expressed in our model is a modification of the
standard discrete choice framework. The consumer decision of interest in our data is not
a choice between observed inside options, but instead one between inside options (online
news) and a set of outside goods (offline news), the latter of whose consumption we cannot
observe. As such, we parameterize the utility of the outside option to change with observed
environmental partisanship rather than everywhere normalize it to zero. As a consumer
moves, we see in our data that the probability of choosing the outside good can go up, down
or stay the same. This, in combination with our knowledge of the consumer’s change in
outside option partisanship relative to their preference, identifies whether offline and online
news sources are substitutes, complements, or independent. Our model flexibly interprets
this relationship in the form of a single structural parameter which we estimate from the
data.
Our model assumes static preferences in political partisanship, and we verify this assumption in our data. We regress the difference in one’s pre- and post-move partisan browsing
1

Designated Market Areas are boundaries created by Nielsen that are intended to map the geographic
extent of a local media market surrounding a metropolitan area.
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preference on the difference between pre- and post-move environmental political lean to
show that there is no short-run influence of environment on political preference. We additionally discuss concerns with migration as a source of identifying variation. We address
these concerns by demonstrating the robustness of our identification strategy to potential
selection problems, and further compare our movers with control users to argue for external
validity. We then explain how we take our model to the data. We discuss how to discretize
the continuous-time article choices that are given by timestamped URL requests by dividing
time into short article-consumption intervals. We also discuss directly what moments in our
data specifically identify our parameters.
We find that, on average, online news browsing behavior is quite persistent in the face of
offline environmental change. When we estimate our model at the population level, the
structural parameter we recover indicates that online and offline news goods are largely
independent. The result implies that even for substantial changes in the characteristics of
the offline environment, online consumption remains relatively stable. Although we explore
this result further, our top-line results indicate the possibility that online digital media
consumption is on average independent of physical geography - at least in the time span
covered by our data - and that any geographical variation in news consumption may thus
come down to variation in consumer preference as opposed to the impact of environmental
news sources.
Further investigation however, reveals significant heterogeneity in the impact of the local
news environment on the consumers in our sample, with some individual users experiencing
large substitution effects, while some exhibit complementarity between the offline and online
goods. This does not contradict our population-level findings, but instead suggests that there
is a richer response to environmental change at the individual level. In order to determine
which characteristics of users are associated with substitution or complementarity behavior,
we undertake two exercises. First, we break users into groups choosing users’ political
ideology, their pre-move interest level in online news, and the size of their environment’s
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partisan shift as our grouping characteristics. We re-estimate our model for each group. Of
these splits, only political alignment produces significant results, and indicates that centrist
users are more likely to substitute when environmental change occurs, but users with more
extreme political preferences see complementarity effects dominate. We cite evidence that
suggests local news options are often quite centrist in character, indicating the possibility
that substitution is concentrated only in the segment of users whose political preferences
match the tone of local options.
Our second exercise entails using machine learning methods to determine how much information a user’s observable characteristics provide in predicting the specific substitute/complement
relationship for that user. We find that a significant portion of this variation is explainable,
and identify the most relevant predictive characteristics. Further, we examine the impact
of these characteristics on substitution/complementarity and find generally that users who
read more widely and those who are more likely to read publications different from their
preferred level of partisanship are more likely to show substitution behavior. In a similar
vein, we find that those who have narrow partisan preferences or read relatively fewer news
publishers are more likely to show strong complementarity effects. We consider mechanisms
for our findings informed by this investigation of heterogeneity, and discuss plans for future
analysis to discriminate between potential mechanisms.
Our work contributes to two distinct streams of literature examining the impact of online
news on the media environment. First, we contribute to the ongoing investigation of the
substitute/complement relationship between online and offline sources we discussed previously. Second, our work engages with a broader set of literatures in the media space.
Our results inform ongoing discussion of the mechanisms of preference for slanted news
(Qin et al. (2018), and Cagé (2020)) as well as literature examining consumption of local
news specifically (e.g. Martin and McCrain (2019) and Moskowitz (2021)). Our exploration
of heterogeneity in our results also contributes to existing literature examining the demographics of news consumption (e.g. George and Waldfogel (2006)). The implications of
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our work regarding the relationship between offline and online news sources contribute to
a broader conversation across academic fields concerning the decline of print media in the
face of rising online consumption (e.g.: Franklin (2014), Nielsen (2015), Harte et al. (2018),
Twenge et al. (2019)).
Further, our use of migration as a source of identifying variation builds upon previous
work using geographical movement to separate out the impact of preferences and environmental supply factors (Logan and Rhode (2010), Bronnenberg et al. (2012), Atkin (2013),
Finkelstein et al. (2016)). Our reduced-form results in Section 1.4 help to strengthen this
literature in that they are in line with extant evidence showing geographically diverse preferences decay quite slowly after a move. Our model’s innovation in identification strategy
expressed via parameterizing the outside option within a discrete choice framework demonstrates how these data can be used more generally to estimate the relevant relationship in a
multi-channel offline/online consumption problem. This is to say, how the relationship between an observable online option and a suite of unobservable offline options can be inferred
via observed shifts in online consumption and offline characteristics.
Last, we contribute to the existing literature in marketing and economics on online/offline
substitution by extending an extant literature examining the broader question of the relationship between online and offline goods in various product markets. Previous work has
found it to be the case that geography is quite important in driving variation in online consumption behavior (e.g. Goolsbee (2001), Forman et al. (2009), Chintagunta et al. (2012),
Bell (2014)). Our work relates to to this literature specifically by showing there is limited evidence for population-level substitution or complementarity between online and offline news
media. We see two possible reasons why our results are different than these earlier studies.
First, the online world has changed much since earlier studies: more than 90% of US adults
now use the internet compared with 50% in 2000, with 79% of internet users going online
multiple times per day (Perrin and Atske (2021)). We believe our results may suggest that
online consumption behavior has ossified in the intervening years, as both consumers and
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online platforms may have become more sophisticated in the online space. Second, media
represents a class of goods distinct from those studied in earlier work, which focused mostly
on retail. Thus, we believe our results may not necessarily contradict earlier results in retail
so much as suggest a different online/offline relationship may hold for other online goods.
In terms of direct implications for the news media industry, when considering the competitive framework within local media markets, offline and online options may not be as close
substitutes as previously thought, at least at the level of the population at large. There has
been recent debate over relaxing FCC regulations regarding ownership of local broadcast media (see e.g. FCC v. Prometheus Radio 592 U.S. 2021 ), relying partly on arguments that
these restrictions could be relaxed as online news provides alternatives to local broadcast
news. Such arguments may not be valid if consumers do not freely substitute between online
news and offline sources, as our results would indicate may be the case for large segments
of the population.
For marketing managers, our results have implications for advertising in local media markets.
37% of Americans tune in often to local television broadcasts, representing a large slice of the
population which is moreover divided into discrete geographical areas (Shearer and Gottfried
(2017)). In addition, this audience tends to skew older, less educated, and with a higher
share of Black Americans (Barthel et al. (2019)). As our results indicate that it may be the
case that there is limited substitution between online and offline news sources, marketers
interested in such a segment of a geographically compact market - perhaps local or regional
businesses or political campaigns - may find local media advertising to be relatively more
valuable if they are unable to target these consumers via online means. When comparing
cost per impression efficacy of advertising channels, our results indicate that marketers
should keep in mind that online and offline news broadcasts may be targeting distinct sets
of consumers.
Section 1.2 outlines the empirical framework we will use to model consumer behavior and
estimate the impact of geography. Section 1.3 describes our data. Section 1.4 reviews model-

7

free evidence showing what happens to online behavior when consumers move. Section 1.5
discusses our estimation procedure. Section 1.6 describes our results. Section 1.7 concludes.

1.2. Empirical Framework
Our goal is to measure the impact of the offline political environment on consumer online
partisan news browsing behavior. In order to do so, we model the consumer news browsing
process via a discrete choice framework. In this section, we present the basics of our model
as well as a discussion of how our model allows us to answer our research question.
1.2.1. Setup
We consider a set of consumers i and a set of online news publishers J indexed by j. In each
discrete period, t, consumer i chooses to read an article from publisher j, obtaining utility
given by
uijt = βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j + ϵijt

(1.1)

where xj is publisher j’s partisanship score,2 and ϵijt is a mean-zero stochastic term. Consumer i has an individual-specific intercept βi0 , as well as individual-specific coefficients βi1 ,
and βi2 .
βi0 defines the baseline preference i has for spending time reading online articles. The individual parameters βi1 and βi2 are applied to xj and x2j , which allow an individual to obtain
maximum utility from a single point on the partisanship scale, with the consumer obtaining
less utility the further away an article’s slant is from that ideal point. We refer to this hereafter as the consumer’s bliss point. Explicitly, this bliss point is defined by the maximum
with respect to xj :

−βi1
.
2βi2

Partisanship entering utility via a bliss point means we assume con-

sumers have a preference for reading news aligned with their preferred political slant. This
assumption is well motivated in the media economics literature (Mullainathan and Shleifer
(2005), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), Durante and Knight (2012)). The direction of the
partisan preference will be governed by βi1 . βi2 will define the rate of decrease in utility as
2

Partisanship scores are measures of a news publisher’s slant, and exist on a -2 (most liberal) to 2 (most
conservative) scale. We discuss these scores further in Section 1.3.
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news partisanship moves away from the consumer’s bliss point - how unwilling the consumer
is to read news of a different slant. The ratio of βi1 and βi2 will determine how far from the
center the individual’s bliss point lies.
We assume that publisher partisanship is the only observable characteristic that defines user
preference for a given publisher’s articles. All other factors that impact consumer choice,
such as the consumer’s varying interest in specific topics or a publisher’s changing selection
of articles, are captured by ϵijt , which enters the user’s utility but is unobservable to us. ϵijt
is assumed to follow type-I extreme value distribution, and draws are iid.
We depart from the standard multinomial logit framework in that we do not normalize the
utility of the outside option to zero, but instead allow it to vary with the partisan characteristics of the user’s location. It is important to note that in our model, the interpretation
of the outside option remains the same as in the standard model. This means that it is still
assumed to be the utility-maximizing option the consumer can achieve outside of reading
online news articles from publishers in the consideration set.
If instead the consumer chooses the outside option of not reading an article, she obtains
utility
ui0t = βi1 θvc(i)t + βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 + ϵi0t

(1.2)

where vc(i)t is the GOP vote-share of DMA c(i)t, which is the DMA in which consumer i
resides at time t. ϵi0t is a mean-zero stochastic term. Consumer i has individual coefficients
βi1 and βi2 defining partisanship preference, which are the same βi1 and βi2 as in equation
(2.1). θ is our structural parameter governing the relationship between online and offline
partisan news.
Our expression for the utility of the outside option follows the utility from equation (2.1).
We maintain βi1 and βi2 , but in place of the publisher’s partisanship score xj we have inserted
the offline partisanship level as x0 = θvc(i)t . The vote share vc(i)t serves as a proxy for the
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level of partisanship we expect to find in the offline environment. Although vc(i)t exists on
a scale of 0% to 100% in the raw data, we re-scale it in our analysis to exist on the same
-2 to 2 partisanship scale as our browsing scores for ease of interpretation. As the outside
option is not an online article, we remove the parameter that specifically governs the baseline
utility to the consumer of browsing online news, βi0 . The parameter θ can be thought of as
a coefficient defining the relationship between online and offline partisanship, which we will
explain further in the following discussion section.
1.2.2. Discussion
We can think of θ as serving two roles: first as a technical scaling parameter, and second
as a structural parameter governing the substitute/complement relationship between online
and offline news.
In the first role, that of a scaling parameter, we note that equation (1.2) parameterizes the
outside option such that the utility of partisanship enters in the same manner as it would
for an inside good. The βi1 and βi2 parameters define an individual’s utility obtained from a
given partisanship for both the observable goods as well as the outside option. If we set aside
the baseline preference for online browsing given by βi0 , we can thus see that up to θ, the
only difference between the utilities is that we enter the DMA partisanship for the outside
good instead of a publisher score as we would for the inside goods. Thus, the scale of θ can
either magnify or dampen the impact of offline partisanship relative to online partisanship.
Supposing for the sake of illustration that θ were positive, then a θ value of one means
that the change in utility of the outside option due to a given partisan shift is the same as
a change in utility for an online good whose slant changed by the same amount - neither
intensification nor attenuation of the effect of partisanship would occur. A θ less than
1 indicates a dampened effect of partisanship on the user’s utility compared to the same
change in the online good, and a θ greater than one means offline partisanship changes have
a greater utility impact. Thus, our model “translates,” via θ, utility from environmental
partisanship to utility online partisanship from the point of view of the consumer.
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The second role of θ is that its sign tells us about the nature of the relationship between
the online goods and the offline outside option. While the multinomial logit framework
typically imposes a substitution relationship between goods in the model, the fact that
we do not restrict θ to be strictly positive effectively relaxes this assumption. A positive
θ indicates that consumers respond to the changing partisanship in their environment by
reducing their online consumption when their environment becomes more favorably partisan
(i.e. offline options become relatively more attractive), and increasing their online news
consumption when the environment becomes less favorably partisan. A negative θ would
describe the opposite relationship - the relative utility of consuming online news increases as
the offline environment becomes more favorably partisan. Complementarity could occur for
a number of reasons but one possible mechanism might be that news browsing is a partially
social activity, with utility deriving from sharing articles with friends. In this case, having
one’s local offline social milieu become more favorably partisan would increase the utility
from browsing news, as it could be shared and discussed among those offline networks. Last,
recovering a θ equal to zero would imply that there is no impact on the user’s online behavior
from changes in the partisanship of the offline environment.
For example, consider a conservative user (i.e., a user whose βi1 and βi2 parameters imply a
right-of-center bliss point) who is moving from a centrist district to a more liberal district.
We thus have
vc(i)∗ > vc(i)0 > vc(i)1
where t = 0 pre-move, t = 1 post-move, and vc(i)∗ =

−βi1
2βi2

is the bliss point partisanship.

Now, the utility levels of the observable goods defined in equation (2.1) are unchanging
before and after the move - we assume a user gets the same utility from reading an article
on the internet no matter where that reading occurs. However, we will observe in the data
a change in the choice probability of the observable goods. As the utilities of the goods
themselves are unchanging, what must change is the utility the consumer achieves from the
outside good, impacting the choice probabilities of the inside goods. The direction and size
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of this change in utility of the outside option will be governed by the scale and sign of θ. We
include Figure 1.1 to illustrate this relationship in our hypothetical example, demonstrating
how different values of θ correspond to differing changes in inside good choice probability
given an identical user making an identical move.

Figure 1.1: Effect of θ on Inside Good Choice Probability
Note: In this example, we have a user with a bliss point of 0.5 on the -2 to 2, scale. We assume the user
moves from a DMA with a partisanship of 0 on this scale to a partisanship of -0.5. Assuming the available
online options are identical before and after the move, the y-axis represents the percent increase or
decrease in the mover’s choice probability for reading online news, conditional on the value of θ given on
the x-axis.

1.3. Data
In order to recover the parameters of our model and answer our research question, we need to
take advantage of the unique properties of our data. In this section, we explain the structure
of our data. We also describe the criteria via which we select the sample of users with which
we will fit our model. Last we describe how our sample of users shows geographical variation
consistent with real world population-level variation.
1.3.1. Sources and Structure
We combine three separate sources of raw data in order to produce the final data set that
we will use. These three sources are browsing data from a major web browser, news article
data scraped from the internet, and publisher political scores from Allsides.com.
User Browsing Data: The basic structure of the browsing data is a list of web browser
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requests, which are organized into sessions. This, in essence, is a list of user actions. When
a user visits a web page, the browser sends an HTTP message to the address of a given
URL, requesting the contents of the web page corresponding to that URL. Thus, each URL
request in our data implies a user action: directing the browser to request the given web page
either through clicking a link or typing the address into an address bar. These actions come
with some attached metadata that we use to organize our data. Among these metadata is a
user ID that allows us to uniquely identify the user in our data that is making the specified
request. This ID is created by the browser at the time of installation, and is specific to the
instance of the browser on a given device - the ID does not follow a user’s account across
different machines or to different browsing products on the same machine. Further, a time
stamp for each request is recorded, as well as a dwell time. The dwell time is the amount of
time the browser “dwells” after a given request before another URL request occurs. Finally
a reverse-IP location object is associated with each of the requests. This object indicates
the ZIP code of the IP from which the request was sourced, which we assume is the user’s
ZIP. The requests are also grouped into sessions. Sessions are defined by two events which
cause a new session to start: either the user has been inactive for greater than 90 minutes,
or a new browser window has been opened.
Due to the size of the data, we identify users who have moved DMA via a smaller browsing
sample than the full browsing data we will use for our subsequent analysis. For this smaller
browsing sample, we choose to sample a week of data (February 1-7, 2017) for what we will
call the “before” period, and another week of data (February 1-7, 2018) that will serve as
the “after” period. We identify movers by finding users whose IP locations indicate they are
in different places in these before and after periods. After finding these users, we extend the
observation periods to a full month each (Feb 1-28, 2017 and Feb 1-28, 2018) to both get a
fuller picture of each user’s browsing, and importantly, to ensure that we are only looking
at users who maintain consistent location in both periods. By checking that users maintain
a consistent DMA for a whole month, we can eliminate users who are merely traveling
temporarily for vacation or business. We select a year gap in between the users to balance
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two factors: we would like to ensure that the gap is long enough such that enough migration
will occur for us to have an adequate sample, yet the gap cannot be too long, as user IDs
may reset for various reasons in the interim. A reset user ID means we can no longer link
that user across time.3
We focus on the users who are active during both of the sampled weeks as potential movers.
We eliminate users who are browsing in areas outside the United States, which removes
69.6%, of our users. Using the reverse-IP location recorded for a user’s browsing, we can
generate a list of locations that have been observed for that user. Although these reverse-IP
locations are recorded at the ZIP code level, for the purposes of our analysis we aggregate
all ZIP codes up to the DMA that contains them. We focus on the DMA level because we
want moves to reflect real differences in offline media markets. Thus, from here onward,
references to the location of a user refer to that user’s DMA. We look only at users who
browse from a single location in 2017 and a single location in 2018. If these locations are
different, we assume we have a potential move. This list of potential movers represents
142,026 users. Although our primary model described in Section 1.2 does not use control
(non-mover) users, we select some of these users for comparison purposes when we describe
the behavior of movers in our data, and to check to ensure the selection effect of identifying
movers does not yield a sample of users that is behaviorally different from their peers. To
select a sample of these users, we take the set of all users who browse in only a single DMA,
and then apply the same set of browsing activity criteria we outlined for movers. We obtain
20,000 control users via this method.
Articles: In addition to the browsing data, we also have data on news articles that correspond to the browsed URLs. These data are generated by a daily scraper that retrieves
article data from a list of known news websites. The list is comprised of the 2700 largest
English-language online news publishers accessed by U.S. readers and 1000 known fake news
3
In our browsing data, unique user IDs could be reset for a variety of reasons such as switching browsers
or software updates. It is reasonable to assume there are more users who are active across both time periods
who we cannot observe since one of these actions occurred. We can be sure, however, that the users we
identify as being active in both periods are the same user, as user IDs are not recycled.
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publishers. Unique articles are identified and assigned a “canonical URL” which serves as
a primary key that will identify the article uniquely going forward. We use these scraped
data to identify which of our users’ requests are news URLs, and also to link them with a
specific article and publisher.
Publisher Political Scores: In order to obtain scores for political news publishers, we
turn to ratings provided by Allsides.com. Allsides rates publications on a scale where any
publication can be placed into one of five possible buckets: Left, Lean Left, Center, Lean
Right, and Right. We convert these to a numerical scale corresponding to -2, -1, 0, 1, and
2, respectively. The Allsides ratings are based on “editorial reviews, blind bias surveys,
independent reviews, and third party research.” 4 We treat their method as a black box and
engage only with the final ratings. There is occasionally a case in which Allsides assigns
separate scores to the editorial content and straight news coverage of the same publisher.
As we only have a single publisher associated with the articles in our data, in this case we
simply assign the publisher the average of the two scores, so half-integer scores occur in our
data. We have many more publishers in our sample than we do ratings provided by Allsides,
however. This is due primarily to the fact that most news consumed in our sample is not
politically salient, and rather comes in the form of news consumption from websites oriented
around other topics, such as sports or celebrity content. Such content cannot simply be
scored 0 because it is not centrist from a partisan standpoint, but is rather not political at
all. Conversely, Allsides does not necessarily score all possible political content. We choose
to obtain the top 100 political news publishers ranked by their frequency of views in our
data. The 100th-ranked publisher is visited by only 33 users in our data, so beyond this
cutoff there is not much density in coverage. Among our chosen publishers, the average
score given to a publication is -0.2427, representing 52 publications scored as liberal (score
less than 0), and 28 publications scored conservative. Allusers also scored 22 publications
as centrist with a score of 0.
4

Allsides.com
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1.3.2. Final Sample Characteristics
We introduce a few more restrictions filtering users out to get to our final sample. We
believe some of the user IDs in the sample may not represent human users, but instead are
bots with unreasonably large browsing activity numbers. As such, we take a step to prevent
this in eliminating any user with over 1,000 news clicks in either the before- or after- move
period. This removes 1.27% of users, leaving us with 140,226 users. Then, as was previously
indicated, we remove users who are not in a consistent DMA in both the before- and aftermove periods. This eliminates 23.9% of the remaining sample, and thus end up with 106,657
movers after this filter. Last, In order to ensure we select a group of users with sufficient
data to estimate our model, we set a minimum level of news browsing activity of 2 URL
requests per week in both the before- and after- move periods, as well as a minimum of 3
distinct news publishers. This last restriction leaves us with our final sample of 28,484 users.
In Table 1.1 we display some basic characteristics of our final sample. This table displays
pre-move statistics to get an idea of what the movers look like prior to any impact on their
habits by migration. Looking at “Total Clicks,” a median of 2,022 indicates that most of our
users are fairly active online. We also show the number of “News Clicks” that we identify
with one of our rated partisan publishers. To calculate the “Diet Score” referenced in Table
1.1, we take the set of all article URL requests for each user i over either February 2017 or
February 2018 (represented as t ∈ {old, new}) as At (i). Then, from these news clicks we take
the subset of those articles that are from one of our rated political publishers: Pt (i) ⊆ At (i).
After this, we assign each political article j ∈ Pt (i) the Allsides political score xj associated
with the article’s publisher j. We then take the simple average of political scores for all
political articles in the set:
y(i) =

1 X
xj
n
j∈Pt (i)

where n is the total number of articles clicked with a political score. Keeping in mind
that the maximum score given to a publication is 2 (and minimum -2), then the user score
must also fall within this range. We can see that the median user reads a somewhat liberal
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news diet. However, the mix of conservative news read tends to be more extreme on the
partisanship scale, so the overall mean is thus shifted towards the center.
Table 1.1: Statistics of Final Mover Sample

Observations
Min
Median
Max
Mean
Std. Dev.

Total Clicks

News Clicks

Diet Score

Pol. Diff.

Abs. Diff.

28,484
14
2,022
34,192
2,605
2,241

28,484
8
26.0
970
48.6
68.7

28,484
-2.00
-0.44
2.00
-0.12
1.06

28,484
-0.593
-0.004
0.568
-0.006
0.015

28,484
0.000
0.098
0.593
0.116
0.081

Notes: “Total Clicks” represents the sum of all URL requests associated with a given user. “News
Clicks” represents the sum of all requests whose URL is associated with an Allsides news publisher.
“Diet Score” is the equal-weighted mean of the partisanship scores of a user’s news requests. “Pol.
Diff.” is the 2016 GOP vote share of a user’s after-move DMA minus the 2016 GOP vote share
of the before-move DMA. “Abs. Diff” is the absolute value of the user’s political move difference.

Political difference is defined as the 2016 US Presidential Election GOP vote share (aggregated up from county-level results) of the destination DMA, minus the 2016 GOP vote share
of the pre-move DMA. Note that vote share exists on a 0-1 range, unlike the browsing scores.
The average move has essentially zero political salience, which is to say that the number of
movers moving to more conservative DMAs is roughly equal to the number moving to more
liberal DMAs.
We also examine the absolute value of these moves to get an idea of the “size” of a typical
move in terms of absolute political difference. The median move is to a DMA whose vote
share is different by roughly 10 vote share percentage points. This is comparable to a move
from Richmond, VA to Boston, MA, or Columbia, SC to New York, NY.
1.3.3. Variation Across Geography
We expect the browsing scores of individuals in our data to be correlated with the partisan
lean of their DMAs. If our sample of users is indeed capturing a representative selection
of individuals in a given DMA, we would expect, for example, more of these users to be
conservative in DMAs where there are a higher percentage of conservative voters. To check
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this, we aggregate our users and their partisan browsing scores up to the level of their
respective DMA to determine if the resulting aggregate score correlates with that DMA’s
partisan lean. We proceed as follows: For a given DMA, D, we find the set of users i who
reside in D. We call this set I(D). Then, for each DMA we aggregate users by taking the
equal-weighted average of their political scores:

DM A Score =

1 X
y(i)
m
i∈I(D)

where m is the number of users in the DMA. In two figures, Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3
we show respectively the geographical distributions of both the average browsing scores by
DMA, and the 2016 GOP vote share of a given DMA. These plots use only the 2017 data,
so as to eliminate noise from migration.

Figure 1.2: Browsing Score by DMA (Darker shades are more conservative)

In Figure 1.4 we plot the DMA-level political score we just described on the y-axis, against
the DMA’s 2016 GOP vote share on the x-axis. Again, in order to eliminate noise due
to the migration in the data, this plot is calculated using only the 2017 data, which is
pre-move data. The correlation is visible, at 0.62. It is also possible to see that the more
GOP-leaning DMAs have higher variance in their political scores than the more Democratic
leaning DMAs. This is likely due to the fact that the GOP-leaning DMAs contain fewer
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Figure 1.3: GOP Vote Share by DMA (Darker shades are more conservative)

users per DMA on average, leading to a more noisy estimate of the DMA’s average news
browsing habits. However, we can be reasonably assured that the geographical variance of
browsing habits found within our sample maps to reality. At the user level, we see much
more noise in the data. Indeed, if we attempt the same plot as Figure 1.4 using only userlevel data, we only see a correlation of 0.09. This makes sense, however, as users drawn from
a given DMA could be anywhere on the political spectrum compared to the average for that
DMA.

1.4. Model-Free Evidence
Prior to estimating our model, we display patterns related to user migration in our data, as
we are interested in testing if there are observable browsing and media consumption differences due to migration - what happens to your online life when you move? We also verify
that user’s ideal level of news partisanship is unchanging over a one-year period, providing
evidence for the validity of our model. Last, we address the implications of using migration
as our source of identifying variation by examining the impact of potential endogeneities on
the internal and external validity of our results. In sub-section 1.4.1 we provide evidence
that there are indeed meaningful changes that occur in the browsing behavior of users when
they migrate. Subsection 1.4.2 then provides evidence for the validity of our assumption of
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Figure 1.4: DMA Political Scores versus GOP Vote Share
Note: The x-axis shows the GOP vote share in a given DMA. The y-axis shows the average political
browsing score in that DMA for users in our data.

consistent political preferences we discuss in Section 1.2, and subsection 1.4.3 argues for the
internal and external validity of our results given our identification strategy.
1.4.1. Changes Due to Migration
We find that after a move, individuals increase the average number of publishers from
whom they browse news from 7.28 to 7.87 on average. We thus look to pre-and post-move
political news browsing habits in more detail in the graphs in Figures 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7.
These figures examine the mean article consumption in each partisan rating bucket for users
whose pre-move diets we define as liberal (score <-0.5), centrist (score -0.5 − 0.5), and
conservative (score >0.5). Of our 28,484 users, roughly half (14,134) can be defined as
liberal, 8,234 as conservative and the remaining 5,889 as centrist according to their news
preferences. After moving, we see both the liberal and the conservative users read more
articles that run counter to their partisan preferences relative to what they did prior to the
move, while consuming more articles overall. Centrist users consume even more centrist
articles and a lower percentage of their news diets come from reading articles with a liberal
or conservative slant. Indeed, if we look at the average variance of a user’s browsing choices
(i.e., the variance of political scores of the selection of articles the user has chosen) of the news
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articles consumed in the before and after move periods, we can see that centrist variance
decreases from 1.50 to 1.04, while liberal and conservative variance increases from 0.63 to
0.74, and 0.76 to 0.84 respectively.

Figure 1.5: Liberal User News Diets Pre- and Post-Move

Figure 1.6: Centrist User News Diets Pre- and Post-Move

One issue that is immediately noticeable is how clustered conservative readers are on very
conservative news outlets. The likely reason for this is that very few outlets are coded
as conservative (score = 1), with the majority of right-of-center news being coded as very
conservative. Thus, anyone with a conservative news diet will predominantly read very
conservative publications. This is additionally reflected in the news diets of the centrist
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users, who read roughly equal amounts of left-leaning and right-leaning news, but the rightleaning news comes almost entirely from publishers rated very conservative.

Figure 1.7: Conservative User News Diets Pre- and Post-Move

We also examine changes to the source of consumer news browsing before and after the moves
occur. These source charts are displayed in Figure 1.8. From these we can note that the
source shares of online news are broadly similar pre- and post-move, with direct navigation
(typing a news website directly into a browser) forming the lion’s share of news browsing in
both cases.5 A large fraction of news sources are indeterminate and this fraction is classified
as “other,” but this share is relatively constant both pre- and post-move. The large changes
occur in two areas: first, the share of news coming from search engines increases, and the
share coming from social media decreases.
The search share increasing after a move is of interest as a potential mechanism for how
offline interactions might impact online news browsing - family, friends, and coworkers might
discuss news topics in person, priming users to search for these topics later. If this is the
case, it is not supported in the data as we see relatively more search activity after the move.
The decrease in social media news is also striking considering we see much more social
media activity following a move. However, in January of 2018 Facebook (which accounts
for the majority of articles sourced via social media) announced an algorithm change that
5

This is in line with previous research on browsing behavior, i.e. Flaxman et al. (2016).
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de-prioritized news that had not been shared or interacted with by a user’s Facebook friend
(Zuckerberg (2018)). This is likely a factor behind the decrease in news found during social
media browsing and it indeed shows up in the browsing patterns of our control users as well.

Figure 1.8: Pre- and Post- Move Percentage of News Diet by Source
Note: Source is a classification of news URLs by provenance: e.g. a user arriving at a news URL after
clicking a link to that URL on Facebook would be classified as a social URL. Direct refers to direct
navigation to a publisher’s website, email includes links shared over email, social refers to social media
websites, search refers to links clicked after using a search provider, and other contains the remainder of
news clicks.

1.4.2. Constant Political Preferences
Our model assumes consumer preferences for political partisanship are constant over time.
In making this assumption, we rely on evidence from a large literature in marketing and
economics that shows geographically diverse preferences persist after migration across a wide
variety of consumption categories, decaying only slowly over a long time. (Logan and Rhode
(2010), Bronnenberg et al. (2012), Atkin (2013), Finkelstein et al. (2016)).
This assumption is also in line with extant literature in political science (e.g. Sears and Funk
(1999)) that shows great consistency in political ideology over time. As this literature has
shown decay in preference stability only over the long term, we feel that our time span of
only one year places us comfortably within the finding of little to no preference change. We
wish to check this assumption formally, however. We write down a linear model to test to
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see if there is environmental influence on the level of partisan slant the individual prefers
from online news.

yit = αt + γi + ϕvc(i)t + ϵit

(1.3)

where for individual i at given time t, yit is the browsing score (as described in Section
1.3.2), αt is an intercept for any national trends in publisher partisanship between 2017 and
2018, γi is an individual partisan news fixed effect, and ϕ represents the relative influence of
from offline options proxied by the DMA’s political lean. The environmental political lean
user i experiences is quantified via the GOP vote share (v) in the DMA in which the user
resides (c(i)). Since users move DMAs, we include the subscript t for the vote share, giving
us vc(i)t .
As our assumption is that partisan slant preferences are unchanging over the span of a single
year, then the ϕ value should be equal to zero. We assume no geographical change in costs or
ability to acquire online news of any slant, thus the realized browsing score should be equal
to the user’s static partisan preference (γ), up to noise and any national trend in publishing
partisanship.
Dependent variable:
Browsing Score Change
Vote Share Change
Constant

−0.003 (0.031)
−0.094∗∗∗ (0.004)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

28,482
4.319e-07
-3.468e-05
0.7546 (df = 28482)
0.0123 (df = 1; 28482)

Note:

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 1.2: Differenced Model
“Vote Share Change” corresponds to the difference vi2018 − vi2017 resulting from differencing equation (1.3)
between t = 2018 and t = 2017, and “Browsing Score Change” corresponds to yi2018 − yi2017

In order to estimate this equation using our data, we can simply take differences between
24

t = 2017 and t = 2018 to obtain an equation that can be estimated via OLS. The resulting
baseline specification can be seen in Table 1.2. The coefficient of interest is “Vote Share
Change.” These results indicate that the individual’s preference for partisan news browsing
is not impacted by the change in DMA. Although this does not rule out any “drift” in partisan
preferences within an single individual, we are comfortable that there is no systematic change
in preferences due to environmental factors. We thus feel confident to assume consistent
political preferences in our model described in Section 1.2.
1.4.3. Potential Concerns with Migration
As our identification strategy relies on user migration, we wish to address the potential
impact of selection effects on our results. Selection in migration could occur if the decision
to migrate is not random, and is instead motivated by some cause that could be correlated
with any of our explanatory variables. We split these concerns into two overarching themes:
threats to internal validity, and threats to external validity. We first address threats to the
internal validity of our model, and then argue for external validity.
Internal Validity
When considering internal validity, we first consider our model as written in Section 1.2.
While individual choices between online news options identify an individual’s β parameters,
our ultimate concern is the identification of θ. This θ is identified by the difference in
observed choice probability for the outside option before and after an individual moves. As
such, it is not the choices between specific online options nor the baseline propensity to
choose the outside option that is of concern to us, but rather the change in this latter choice
probability after a move occurs. Potential endogeneity wherein the error term is correlated
with specific xj ’s is thus not an issue in our model so long as such correlation holds in both
the offline and online worlds. Any endogeneity in xj would difference out and not threaten
identification as well if the endogeneity existed both before and after the move.
To illustrate what this means, consider a situation where individuals are making their choices
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based on some unobserved characteristic that is correlated with partisanship. Perhaps an
individual specific intercept term, such as ξij . This would yield a true choice process that
looks like:

uijt = βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j + ξij + ϵijt

(1.4)

Where all terms are identical to equation (2.1), save for ξij which represents an individual
publisher specific intercept. We can easily imagine a scenario where this could be the case:
consider that an individual likes to read the New York Times because of a certain writing
style, which enters via ξij and is unobservable to the researcher. In our model, because the
New York Times is a left-leaning publication, it would appear as if this user simply enjoyed
reading left-leaning news. However, for our identification strategy, this is not a problem so
long as the writing style in question is correlated with partisanship in the same way for both
online and offline news. If offline conservative papers, for example, mimic the writing of the
Times while offline liberal papers mimic the style of Fox News, we may have a problem, but
this does not seem likely.
In a similar way, it is possible to see that movement based on political preferences does
not cause immediate issues for our identification strategy. If individuals prefer to move
because they are politically motivated to do so - a liberal individual living in Texas wishes
to move to San Francisco, for example - the impact of their destination on their online
browsing habits will enter through the vc(i)t term, and will not engender any endogeneity
issues within the model. We can also imagine situations where moves are not themselves
politically motivated, but where there is political bias in who is more likely to move - liberals
might be more mobile, for example. This too is not a cause for concern, because it would not
induce an endogeneity problem but would merely yield more liberals in our sample versus
their presence in the population. We address concerns surrounding this scenario in our next
section on external validity.
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External Validity
The second way in which we may encounter issues is in generalizing our results, which are
based on the actions of those who migrate, to the general population. This is in essence an
issue of external validity, which is threatened in the case that the movers in our data are
fundamentally different in behavior and habits from the population writ large. To address
this, we undertake two examinations. First we will display patterns of migration in our data
and show that moves in our data are balanced, which is beneficial for our model. Then, we
will compare our movers to a set of control users and show that they are similar in overall
characteristics.
The distribution of moves in our data is displayed in Figure 1.9. Here, the x-axis describes
the destination political lean minus the starting political lean of the given move, so 0 on
this scale would mean a move to a new DMA with the exact same partisan lean. As is
apparent in the graph, moves are almost perfectly symmetrical around the mean, which
means we have a roughly equal number of moves to more conservative DMAs as we do to
more liberal DMAs. There is no partisan bias in move directionality at this level. Moreover,
an individual’s partisan alignment is not predictive of the direction of their move - the
correlation between pre-move browsing score and destination partisanship is 0.013. Further,
what is advantageous about the balance in move directionality as displayed in Figure 1.9 is
that it means any sort of nationwide trend in news consumption would not bias our estimate
of θ in either direction.
Finally, we can also take advantage the availability of control users (as mentioned in Section 1.3) to argue for the external validity of any estimates taken from our population of
movers. In Table 1.3 we compare a set of population statistics for both our treatment and
control users in order to show their similarity. While in most cases the differences are not
statistically significant, for two of our comparisons (the percentage of news consumed on
evenings and weekends as well as the percentage of news sourced via direct navigation) do
show significant differences. Overall, statistically significant differences are somewhat more
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Figure 1.9: Political Move Size Distribution

common than we would expect from random chance, and these two populations do appear
to be statistically distinct. However, what’s important to note is that economically, the sizes
of these differences do not appear to be particularly large, with roughly half of all differences smaller than a percentage point in size, and only a single metric showing a difference
between groups greater than 5%. Thus while the populations may be distinct at a statistical
level, at a practical level they are indeed quite similar.

1.5. Identification and Estimation
this section, we outline how we take our model to the data to estimate our model’s parameters. First, a few details are required to explain exactly how the structure of our data as
described in Section 1.3.1 can be organized to fit our model. Second, we explain how our
parameters are identified by the moments of our data. Last, we describe our estimation
procedure.
Recall that our model supposes discrete choices among articles in discrete time periods t.
Using the data from our article scraper, we are able to distinguish bona fide article URLs
from other URLs associated with a given publisher’s domain, such as a home page or another
landing page. Any click on an article URL from publisher j is considered a choice to consume
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Table 1.3: Mover and Controls Comparison

Variable
Total Browsing
Total Pol. News
Evening and Weekend News*
Direct News*
Search News
Social Media News
Email News
News Publishers
Variance of Browsing Score

Mover Mean

Control Mean

% Difference

2605.33
48.63
57.82%
46.93%
11.06%
10.49%
1.81%
7.27
0.852

2627.97
48.73
58.05%
49.09%
11.51%
9.89%
1.73%
7.31
0.840

-0.9%
-0.2%
-0.4%
-4.6%
-4.1%
5.7%
4.9%
-0.6%
1.4%

Variables listed in bold with asterisks are those significant at the 95% level in a two-sample t-test
comparing mover an control means. The observation period for both groups is February 2017, prior to any
migration. Variables are defined as follows: Total Browsing is the total number of clicks using the browser.
Total Pol. News represents the total number of clicks on an article from one of our publishers whose
partisanship is rated by Allsides. Evening and Weekend News describes the percentage of news clicks
occurring outside of 9am-5pm in the local timezone, Monday - Friday. Direct News represents the
percentage of articles clicked after direct navigation to a publisher’s homepage, Search News represents
articles clicked after using a search engine, Social Media News is that sourced from a social media website,
and Email News is news clicked after opening an email. News Publishers counts the number of unique
publishers the individual accesses for news. Variance of Browsing Score is the variance of the vector of
publisher scores whose entries correspond to the series of articles clicked during the observation period.
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that article from publisher j. As our URLs are timestamped, we can place the choices in
the appropriate order. What remains is to discretize time so that the choices can be paired
to the appropriate t, and that there is no more than one choice per t. To do this, we divide
all the time in our sample into periods with a length of 5 minutes. Now each of these five
minute periods can be labeled as a separate t. In our data, however, there are instances when
users click on articles more rapidly than five-minute intervals. In this case, we assume that
the consumer has “queued” articles to read over the subsequent periods. Thus, if articles k1 ,
k2 , and k3 were clicked within a single five-minute period t, we treat that as a decision to
read article k1 in period t, k2 in period t + 1, and k3 in period t + 2. In this way, we have
converted our continuous-time timestamped URL requests into a series of discrete choices
by our users.
To explain the variation in our data that identifies our model, we first define define
θ ′ = [β10 , β11 , β12 , ..., βn0 , βn1 , βn2 , {θ}]

to be the 1 x (3n + k) vector of all of our model’s parameters where n is the number of
users. {θ} is the set of θ parameters that we will estimate, which is of length k. As θ can
identified in the individual level, k will be in the range from 1 (estimating a single θ̂ for
the whole population) to n (estimating an individual θˆi for each user). Note that for each
individual i we have a triple of β parameters, (βi0 , βi1 , βi2 ). Each triple is identified separately
for each individual, as we have enough choice data pre- and post- move in order to do so. The
first element, the βi0 parameter, is identified by an individual’s overall, baseline propensity to
browse online news versus consume the outside option. The βi1 and βi2 parameters are jointly
identified by an individual’s relative choice probabilities of articles from online publishers
based on those publishers’ partisanship scores.
The remaining parameter to identify is θ. An intuitive way to understand how θ is identified
directly from the data is to consult Figure 1.1 from Section 1.2. In this case we will discuss
how to identify an individual θi , but the same logic applies for identifying θ at the group
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or population level. Recall that this chart illustrates an individual with a bliss point of 0.5
on the -2 to 2 scale, making a move from a perfectly centrist DMA (0 on the partisanship
scale) to a new DMA with a partisanship of -0.5. Now, when the individual moves, the β
parameters will tell us whether the partisan move is towards or away from the individual’s
preferred level of partisanship. All that remains is to infer θ from the resultant change in
online browsing. To see this, simply flip the axes on Figure 1.1: if the consumer’s news
browsing increases 60%, then we trace along the curve to see this corresponds to a θ̂ value
of roughly 1. This makes intuitive sense as positive θ implies substitution, and the user
is substituting to online news sources when the offline environment becomes less favorably
partisan. The change in choice probability after a move identifies the parameter. In this
example, we have identified θ at the level of the individual user. However, we can also identify
θ at the population level by repeating the same process but assuming a single θ applies to
every user in the data. Thus, we need only take the overall θ̂ that jointly maximizes the
likelihood of the model’s implied choice probabilities across all users.
We estimate the model via maximum likelihood. The log likelihood function is

LL(θ) =
I X
J X
T
X

log{
+ I(yit = 0) log{

exp(βi1 θvc(i)t +
exp(βi1 θvc(i)t +

I(yit = j)I(yit ̸= 0)
i=1 j=0 t=1
exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )
}
P
βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 ) + Jj=1 exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )
exp(βi1 θvc(i)t + βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 )
}
P
βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 ) + Jj=1 exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )

(1.5)

where the parameters θ are defined as in Section 1.2, yit is consumer i’s decision j at time t.
I() is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the argument is true, and 0 if false. Note that
the outside option is indexed to choice j = 0, and the J news publishers are indexed as j =
1, ..., J. The notable difference between our likelihood function and the standard multinomial
logit likelihood is that ours contains an extra term indicating a different likelihood value for
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choices of the outside option, as our outside option is separately parameterized. A few
difficulties arise in estimation due to data size and computational challenges. These issues,
and how we choose to approach them, are discussed in the appendix. We calculate the
standard errors for our θ̂ estimate via a bootstrap procedure, whose details are also discussed
in the appendix.

1.6. Results
1.6.1. Beta Estimates and Individual Bliss Points
We first consider the estimates for the β coefficients that we estimate for each individual
user in our data. Our model does not impose restrictions on the coefficients, but recalling
Section 1.2, we hypothesized that the estimates of these quadratic utility equations would
yield downward-opening parabolas: bliss points with some level of partisanship which yields
peak utility, and relatively less utility at all other levels of partisanship. We show that this
is indeed the case. In Table 1.4 we display the median and mean estimates for each of our
individual parameters, as well as the standard deviation. We also include the percentage of
individuals for whom the given parameter estimate is significant at the 95% level, and the
percentage for which the estimate is positive. In the last column, we also display these figures
for the individual’s bliss point, which is the utility-maximizing level of news partisanship for
a particular user, given by −βi1 /2βi2 .
Table 1.4: Beta Coefficient Estimate Characteristics

Mean Estimate
Median Estimate
Std. Dev.
Percent Significant
Percent Positive

β0

β1

β2

−β 1 /2β 2

-7.01
-6.24
4.71
100.0%
0.0%

-0.39
-0.14
7.32
79.9%
43.8%

-0.94
-0.28
2.56
73.9%
5.7%

-0.21
-0.24
8.14
N/A
40.2%

Note: “Significant” refers to p < 0.05 for the given point estimate.
−β 1 /2β 2 is the max utility point given the β’s - the “bliss point”

The parameter βi0 represents the individual’s baseline preference for reading political news,
and we can see that it is distributed around a median of -6.24. This parameter governs the

32

user’s propensity to read the news versus the outside option, so we would expect it to be
negative, as most time is not spent reading news. This figure implies that, without taking
into consideration any utility from partisanship, the resulting choice probability would see
the user with the median βi0 read 31 articles per month. Additionally, βi0 is universally
negative (reflecting the fact that for all users, most time is spent not reading news online),
and it is measured precisely, with all the users in our data having statistically significant
estimates.
The characteristics of the βi1 and βi2 also look as we hypothesized they should. βi1 ’s sign
governs the user’s left/right preference for partisanship, and the ratio of βi1 and βi2 will
determine the precise location of the bliss point. The bliss point column shows that the
median bliss point is somewhat left of center, which is precisely what our median user’s
browsing diet looks like. Under the hypothesized structure, βi2 should be negative such that
the user’s utility curve can form a downward-opening parabola whose width is described by
the magnitude of βi2 , and indeed we see 94.3% of βi2 values are less than zero.
In Figure 1.10 we graph the estimated utility functions for a sample of users over the range
of possible article partisanship to show how these parameters combine to form the bliss
point shapes. In these two graphs, the x-axis is the political score of a given article and the
y-axis is the mean utility the user would achieve through consumption of an article with
the corresponding political score. Each graph is constructed in the same way: we select 10
users at random from our sample, and then plot the function βˆi0 + βˆi1 x + βˆi2 x2 in gray over
the range x ∈ [−2, 2] to show the shape of the utility curve over the article partisanship
spectrum. We highlight a single user in red so that this user stands out for examination. In
both pictures, it is apparent that bliss point structures occur across the political spectrum,
and that the shape of our user’s utility curves in most cases forms the downward-opening
parabola that we expect. The varying width of these curves is also of note as the model
allows users to have different levels of flexibility in their willingness to read news from areas
of the political spectrum different from their most preferred partisanship.
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Figure 1.10: User Preference Structure

We also include Figure 1.11 to show the distribution of our estimated bliss points. The
distribution of bliss points is double-peaked with a mass of users having left-leaning bliss
points, and another, narrower mass of users having bliss points on the right. This broadly
follows the distribution of user’s browsing scores, as is expected. Fewer users have entirely
extreme (-2 or 2) bliss points. Further, the bliss points are not bounded by the -2 to 2
partisanship axis scale, so as we can see, there are some users whose bliss points exist outside
the scale on either side. A bliss point outside of the partisanship axis is not necessarily an
error, as some portion of any curve is necessarily defined over the article partisanship interval,
and estimation merely optimizes for the shape of that portion. However, the majority
(85.6%) of user bliss points are within the standard axis range.
1.6.2. Population Theta
When estimated as a single parameter for all users in our sample, our θ̂ value is 0.002, with a
standard error of 0.0044. The result is very close to zero with a tight standard error. In order
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Figure 1.11: Histogram of Bliss Points

to aid in the interpretation of the resulting 95% confidence interval (-0.0024 − 0.0064), we
consider the example user we set forth in Section 1.2, and specifically the range of outcomes
laid out in Figure 1.1. Recall that our example user is a conservative who is undertaking a
move from a centrist area to a more liberal area - a 10% decrease in GOP vote share (this
would be equivalent to a move from San Antonio, TX to Providence, RI). Our confidence
interval for θ̂ would yield a change in consumption of online news between -0.19% and 0.51%
for this user. Our θ̂ implies that across all users, the offline partisan environment and online
news partisan maintain neither a substitute nor complement role. Online news consumption
behavior is stubborn in the face of changes in the offline environment.
1.6.3. Heterogeneity
Although the θ̂ that we recover from our model is close to zero, this is not universally true
at the individual level. Recall θ is identified at the individual level, so we also estimate a θ̂
value for each user. The distribution of these θ̂ values is given in Figure 1.12. As we can see,
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although these estimates are distributed symmetrically about zero, there is wide variation
in what the θ̂ estimate looks like at the individual level. Moreover, the distribution itself is
not quite normal. It can be approximated well by a Gaussian mixture with only two base
distributions: a single central normal distribution with a high peak and thin tails, combined
with a second distribution with much fatter tails extending outward. Due to estimating
these θ̂ values via the grid search described in Section 1.5, the boundaries of the distribution
are capped at the limits of the grid, -5, and 5. There are thus 1,480 “boundary” users who
are excluded from the graph, as we cannot say with certainty that their estimates are indeed
-5 or 5. The true estimates for these users may lie further outward were the grid search to
be expanded.

Figure 1.12: Distribution of Theta Estimates for Individual Users

Thus, while a cluster of many users do exhibit minimal substitution/complementarity in line
with the population-level estimate, it is apparent that a large number of users have estimated
θ̂ values that imply meaningful substitution or complementarity between online and offline
news sources. The question then remains if there are any observable characteristics of users

36

with large or small θ̂ values that would explain such variation in θ̂.
Investigating such a relationship to observable characteristics is valuable for two reasons.
First, from the point of view of developing policy and managerial implications of our research
question, being able to explain the variation in θ̂ is important in its own right as it explains
how the answer to our research question will differ between populations. As an example
from a policy perspective, it may be the case that substitution between local news and online
sources is strong in some regions and minimal in others. Indeed, ownership concentration
percentage restrictions already vary depending on the number of news outlets in a given
geography - in some sense regulation already implies differences in market makeup require
different regulation. As such, predicting θ̂ values from individual or DMA characteristics can
inform this type of tailoring. While the data we have access to do not contain demographic
characteristics, we can still construct many behavioral features from the browsing logs and
metadata to aid in this process.
Second, if heterogeneity is driven by differing impact of the offline environment on online
behavior by behaviorally distinct users, it may provide clues as to what the relevant mechanisms are that make some users switch between online and offline news sources while others
do not. This can potentially enrich our understanding of how individuals engage with news,
and connect to larger questions, providing answers to the “why” behind our specific research
question.
Estimate Differences by Individual User Characteristics:
As a first step, we examine three user characteristics that are intuitive potential sources of
heterogeneity. These three characteristics are the following - first we consider the political
alignment of our users - perhaps users with more extreme political views may always need to
turn to online news sources no matter their physical location. We additionally group users
by their level of pre-move news browsing activity, guessing that heavier browsers may be
more set in their ways. Last, we consider the political “size” of the move, supposing that it
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is possible that only the largest political changes yield sufficient shift in the characteristics
of offline options to produce changes in online behavior. These results are listed respectively
in Figures 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15.

Figure 1.13: Theta Estimates by User Political Preference Bucket
Note: x-axis displays the theta estimate for each group, y-axis displays the political scores of users in the
given bucket. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

These figures reveal that our θ̂ estimate is robust to both move size as well as the user’s
pre-move level of browsing activity. However dividing the users by political alignment yields
subgroups significantly different from the population mean. The subgroup that produces
statistically significant results is the centrist user bucket, who as a group have an estimated
θ̂ of 0.02, with a standard error of 0.0092, yielding a p-value of 0.015. For a typical move
size in our data, this would correspond to an increase or decrease of 2% in online news
browsing, depending on if the move was towards or away from the individual’s preferred
level of partisanship. This finding makes sense, as it could easily be the case that local news
is often centrist in character (recall that many online news options we think of as highly
partisan - such as cable channels like Fox News or MSNBC are nationally distributed),
thus only those with centrist political alignment consider it a substitute for online sources.
Indeed, when Martin and McCrain (2019) investigate the partisanship of local news station
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Figure 1.14: Theta Estimates by User Initial Browsing Activity Bucket
Note: x-axis displays the theta estimate for each group, y-axis displays the political scores of users in the
given bucket. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. The <10 group’s confidence interval is too wide for
the chart and is not displayed.

broadcasts, they find this news to be clustered towards the center of the political spectrum,
so it could well be the case that only more centrist users can find analogous coverage in the
local offline environment.
However, another interesting factor in Figure 1.13 is that users at the extremes tend to
exhibit the opposite behavior, suggesting a complements relationship between online and
offline news sources from the point of view of users with more extreme political preferences.
This is difficult to say with confidence based on the initial split however, as the p-values of
these groups’ means compared with zero are both roughly 0.11. An issue here is that the
more extreme groups contain fewer users than those at the center, which makes for noisier
estimation. In order to ameliorate this, we parameterize θi according to the equation

θi = δ + ψ ∗ abs(political_scorei )

(1.6)

where now a user’s θi value is linear function of how extreme the user’s political preferences
are (given by the absolute value of the user’s political score political_scorei ), as well as
population-level parameters δ̂ and ψ̂. By imposing a linear relationship at the population39

Figure 1.15: Theta Estimates by User Political Move Size Bucket
Note: x-axis displays the theta estimate for each group, y-axis displays the political scores of users in the
given bucket. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

level between political preference extremeness and θi , we can make use of the data from
the entire population without having to choose an arbitrary number of groups into which to
divide users.
The resulting parameter estimates are δ̂ = 0.15, and ψ̂ = -0.1, with respective standard
errors of 0.044 and 0.028. These estimates are thus significant at the 95% level. Put together,
they create the graph of individualized theta values seen in Figure 1.16. For more centrist
users, substitution effects can be seen, whereas for more extreme users, complementarity
dominates. Moreover, this parameterization produces better adjusted model fit than models
with either a single across-population θ̂ or individual-specific θˆi ’s which can be seen in Table
1.5.
Table 1.5: Model Fit Comparison

Single Population Theta
Individual Thetas
Partisan Param. Theta

AIC

BIC

31,170,996
30,816,584
26,903,784

31,684,932
31,501,824
27,471,955

Predicting Theta with All Characteristics:
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Figure 1.16: Parameterized Individual Theta Estimate as a Function of Partisan Browsing Score

Although the extremeness of user political preference provides some information about which
users are driving the heterogeneity in θˆi , even after incorporating the users’ political score
most of the difference in individual user θˆi values remains unexplained. In order to address
this, we turn to machine learning methods to leverage our entire set of user characteristics
in the service of explaining the variation in θˆi . From our browsing data, we create a suite
of characteristics, taking advantage of what we know about news browsing, as well as the
general non-news online habits of our users. Broadly speaking, we look at the politics of
the users, as well as their browsing activity level for political news, non-political news, and
non-news URLs. We also look at measures of the variance of users’ news browsing, as well
as the number of distinct publishers they turn to for their news. Additionally, we look at
browsing behavior in terms of when users do their browsing - daytime versus evenings or
weekends, as well as looking at information on the source of news browsing, whether it comes
from social media, or an aggregator, etc. Last, we take advantage of additional data which
categorizing web domains. This domain categorization allows us to classify the URLs from
our users’ non-news browsing into categories to see if their other activity on the internet
affects their individual θi .
Using these characteristics, we train our predictive models on a selection of 80% of our users
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and their characteristics, and then test the result on the remaining 20% of the data. Our
prediction goal is to predict the individual θˆi that is estimated by our model (those displayed
ˆ
in Figure 1.12). So in some sense, our prediction returns a “ θˆi ” which is a prediction of the
value our model has estimated for that individual’s θ̂.
In terms of prediction performance, we focus on three metrics: the mean squared error
(MSE), root mean squared error (RMSE), and mean absolute error (MAE). These are listed
in Table 1.6 for several predictive models. We list the machine learning model that performs
best - xgboost a boosted regression tree algorithm (Chen and Guestrin (2016)) which delivers an RMSE of 1.43. To give a comparison of how much the accuracy improves using the
features and the prediction algorithm, we include three additional lines in Table 1.6: First,
to show the improvement in performance of the ML method over standard regression implementations, we include our fit metrics for a linear model. Next, we include fit metrics for two
models to serve as a baseline for what a “characteristics-free” attempt at guessing θˆi would
look like. For the first, we assign θˆi by drawing from a uniform random variable over the
range of the grid search (the closed interval -5 to 5). The RMSE using this method is 3.36.
However, this “model” may be a bit too naive, as even without individual user characteristics, we at least know that θˆi values are not distributed uniformly. In order to set a baseline
performance that includes all information we have save for individual characteristics, for our
second baseline we take this information into account. We fit a Gaussian mixture to the
empirical distribution of θ̂ (given in Figure 1.12) and then, for each user, we simply take a
draw from this constructed distribution. This produces an RMSE of 2.33. In either case,
the use of observable characteristics results in considerable accuracy improvement.
To illustrate the performance of the model graphically, we display Figure 1.17 which shows
the model’s predicted θˆi in blue versus the actual estimated θˆi values in red for a random
selection of 50 users. It is easy to see that the model does track the actual values to some
degree, but there is still much unexplained variation in some big misses. Importantly, the
model can often predict whether a particular user will have a positive or negative θˆi , but
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Table 1.6: Theta-Hat Prediction Model Performance

Model

MSE

RMSE

MAE

xgboost
Linear Model
Gaussian Draw
Uniform Draw

2.06
2.84
6.95
11.25

1.43
1.69
2.33
3.36

0.98
1.22
1.87
2.78

MSE is the mean squared error, RMSE the root mean squared error, and MAE the mean absolute error.
All refer to performance figures on 20% of our data held out for testing models trained on 80% of our data.
The linear model refers to all variables entered into a linear regression. The Gaussian draw refers to the
random selection of the predicted θi values from a Gaussian mixture distribution fitted to the empirical
distribution of estimated θ values. The uniform draw refers to a random draw from a uniform distribution
whose bounds are that of the θ grid search procedure, {-5,5}

much of the error is in scale, as it has difficulty in predicting very large or very small θˆi
values. The other major advantage of using this method to predict θˆi is that it can give us
some idea as to what features are important for the purpose of prediction. This provides a
bottom-up, data-driven approach to the problem attacked in the prior subsection - searching
for characteristics of user behavior that can explain heterogeneity and provide insight into
the mechanism behind user behavior. Figure 1.18 displays this visually.
As it is possible to see when examining Figure 1.18, we picked none of the top three features in
terms of predictive power during our initial exploration of theoretically interesting variables.
The best result of this first pass was looking at the political preference of the user, which
is reflected here as the bliss point feature, which is ranked fourth. Although the more
powerfully predictive features all merit additional investigation, some of these features lend
themselves more immediately to theoretical interpretation. For example, the “size of βi2 ”
feature. While βi2 is almost invariably negative for our users, the scale of βi2 governs the
width of the bliss point structure, interpreting how steeply a user’s interest in an article
drops as the partisanship of that article moves away from their preferred slant. In tandem
with the fact that the variance of the user’s browsing diet, as well as the number of publishers
a user reads both show up in the list of important features, this indicates that it may be the
case that users who read more broadly have different substitution/complementarity behavior
than those who stick to a more narrow set of sources. The second interesting variable is
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Figure 1.17: Actual vs. Predicted Individual θ̂ Values
Note: Data selected from 40 random users. For ease of viewing, users are ordered along the x-axis by the
distance between that user’s actual recovered θˆi and the value predicted based on the user’s characteristics.
The y-axis gives the value for both actual and predicted θˆi .

the political lean of the user’s original DMA (old DMA). This is striking not because it is
surprising that those of different political stripe are have different behavior, as this concept
was explored earlier. However, the importance of this feature implies that a user’s home
DMA contains predictive information even after accounting for their political belief - a
conservative from New York could be quite different than a conservative from Alabama
despite them both being equally conservative.
Unfortunately one of the downsides of CART-type models is the inability to directly interpret
the marginal impacts of specific variables as one would in a standard linear model. This
makes for a somewhat difficult task in discussing the implications of certain characteristics
holding predictive power. However, one way to look at this in an average sense is merely to
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Figure 1.18: Relative Predictive Gain by Feature

plot a local regression of the predicted θˆi values on the predictor variable to see how this
variable impacts the predictions on average. Some variables of interest are found in Figure
1.19. In examining the top two graphs, we see these intuitions regarding the impact of β2
are borne out in the data. Keeping in mind that the vast majority of β2 values are below
0, we can see that smaller β2 values are associated with a reduction in predicted θˆi - those
who read more widely are more likely to substitute between online and offline news, whereas
those whose tastes are more narrow show stronger complementarity effects. Although for
very negative values of β2 the curve begins to move in the opposite direction, it is unclear if
this is due to noise given the expanding confidence interval. The variance of one’s pre-move
news diet impacts predicted θˆi in a similar way. Those with very high variance values are
likely to have larger theta values versus those with lower news diet variances.
The remaining two characteristic graphs displayed in Figure 1.19 also display discernible
patterns. In the case of pre-move news consumption, it appears that there is a complementarity effect seen for those with very low pre-move levels of news browsing. One reason why
this may not have shown up in Figure 1.14 is that breaking the users into groups required
somewhat arbitrary delineations between user groups. As such, choosing <10 articles in the
original month could have caused the resulting group to be too small to detect the effect
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given the mandatory 2 article per week filter - the minimum number of articles consumed in
the first month is thus 8. Last, there appears to be something of a difference in the political
alignment of one’s initial DMA on outcomes, with those from more liberal DMAs exhibiting
somewhat more complementarity.

Figure 1.19: Partial Dependence Plots of Key Features

1.6.4. Future Research
We feel this chapter opens up several avenues of extension that we hope to extend outside the
scope of this thesis. These planned analyses can be grouped into three conceptual categories:
first improving upon the accuracy of our model and constructs so as to increase estimation
accuracy, second, continuing our exploration of heterogeneity to provide a fuller picture of
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the mechanism by which our findings occur, and third checking the robustness of our model
and constructs to alternative specifications.
In the first category of extensions, one of our primary goals is to extend the characteristics
of DMAs beyond solely partisanship. We consider two example scenarios to illustrate why
this may be useful in increasing the accuracy of our estimates. Imagine a situation where
certain DMAs have nicer weather, so consumers spend more time outside there relative to
other DMAs, and less time browsing the news online. To be clear, such a scenario would not
bias our estimates even if nice weather were correlated with a political alignment, as such
a unidirectional effect would be balanced across an equal number of arriving movers who
are moving to a more-favorable political environment as those who are moving to a lessfavorable political environment. However this could still generate noise in the estimates.
Another case might be that the total amount of news in a given DMA may interact with
the partisanship of the DMA to create an effect. Consider a move from New York, NY to
Omaha, NE. This represents a sizeable political shift, but Omaha may be a big enough city
that local content can be found for preference minorities. In this case, by focusing on the
quantity of news, we may identify that relevant offline option shift only occur in moves from
New York to politically distinct and much smaller DMAs, such as Abilene, TX. As weather
and news quantity metrics are available, incorporating DMA-specific effects based on these
metrics could potentially yield finer estimates.
In terms of the second idea, we are interested in further identifying the sub-populations of
users who exhibit substitution/complementarity to understand which factors cause which
effects to dominate. A simple measure would be to increase the number of predictive behavioral characteristics in the non-parametric prediction. Beyond user characteristics, we are
also interested in looking at our estimates for specific sub-types of news. Consider a user’s
consumption of local news specifically. For example, an individual with a subscription to a
local paper in a left-leaning area, like the Boston Globe, may be content with this offline
news option in providing both local content and left-leaning national content. However, in
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moving to a right-leaning area, it is now the case that the local paper provides local content but also right-leaning national content. We perhaps now expect this user to use online
sources for the national content. Thus, we could look at this behavior in an online-only way
if we split news between local and national content. As our scraper data provides the full
text for all articles, topic modeling could help distinguish this, even within publishers.
Last, as an example of robustness, we have already attempted to use ZIP codes as our
unit of geographical analysis to check to see if DMAs were too large a geographical boundary. However, we achieved largely similar results. In a similar way we could again take
advantage of the full text data we have for articles and use article text-level partisanship
classification, such as that from Gentzkow et al. (2019). This would check the robustness of
our Allsides.com publisher scores, as well as potentially provide more accurate political preference estimates by down weighting less partisan or non-partisan articles from our partisan
publishers.

1.7. Conclusion
At a population level, the results of our study indicate a θ̂ close to zero which implies independence between online and offline news sources. Although at the population level these
results imply that preference variation, rather than factors in the offline environment, contribute to geographical variation in news consumption, this lack of a relationship between
online and offline news at the population level obscures significant heterogeneity among users.
Indeed the offline environment does appear to impact online news consumption, but such
impact varies greatly depending on consumer characteristics. As this heterogeneity is partially predicted by observable characteristics - some of which provide intuitive explanations
of different online/offline relationships - it is important to note that this population level
finding does not hold for all individuals and that there may be important sub-populations
that experience different effects. Ultimately, from the point of view of policymakers and
marketing managers, online/offline substitution in the realm of news may not be a factor
when considering the population as a whole, but could be quite important when considering
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individual groups. A regulator looking to make decisions about ownership in local media
may for example consider the fact that there does appear to be some degree of substitution
between local and online news options when considering more centrist news, but little to
none for more extreme options. Thus a one-size-fits-all approach may be unwise. Identifying the relevant sub-population pertinent to the online/offline substitution question at hand
could be important to making the correct policy and managerial decisions.
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CHAPTER 2
The Impact of Social Media on News Consumption Choices:
Evidence from the Facebook Algorithm

Michael Kurish and Markus Mobius

2.1. Introduction
In recent years, the impact of social media on society has attracted much scrutiny and
attention. Social media have been accused of having harmful effects on the mental health of
users (Alter (2017), Newport (2019), Allcott et al. (2021)), as well as having negative impact
on the news ecosystem. The crux of this latter criticism rests on accusations of social media
increasing the spread of misinformation (e.g. Vosoughi et al. (2018), Lazer et al. (2018)) at
the expense of more truthful content, as well as reducing the quality of news consumers are
reading. If we desire a healthy news environment, these critiques represent serious concerns
about the quality of information consumed by the average citizen.
Prior work looking to measure the influence of social media on the news ecosystem has
focused on descriptive studies seeking to measure the types of content that are most commonly shared (Pfitzner et al. (2012), Rathje et al. (2021)), as well as experimental work
that focuses on causally analyzing the impact of social media on various outcome metrics (
Mosquera et al. (2020), Allcott et al. (2020), Levy (2021)). There are advantages and disadvantages to either approach. Descriptive studies can look in much more detail at the actual
news articles and links being shared over social media. Moreover, browsing data often allows
us to understand how people consume news through other channels such as aggregators or
direct navigation. Experimental work, on the other hand, makes it easier to identify a causal
impact of social media on the resulting outcomes. Our research seeks to complement these
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two lines of evidence via a third route - an empirical study of online news consumption that
combines the detail typically found in descriptive studies with causal inference stemming
from a natural experiment. Our aim is to provide both the level of detail of observational
work via high quality data, as well as capitalize on a natural experiment to provide credible
causal inference analogous to experimental studies.
In this paper, we seek to measure the causal impact of social media on the quantity of
news consumed, as well as content. We look specifically at Facebook, as in terms of news
consumption, it is by far the most important social network - roughly 75% of news sessions
originating from social media in our data come from Facebook. The key to our strategy is
the exploitation of a natural experiment occurring in early 2018 in which Facebook itself
sought to limit the spread of news on its own website, resulting in a precipitous decline in
the ability of users to obtain their news from Facebook. We use a unique set of browsing
data to observe this impact on Facebook. Importantly, our browsing data let us view the full
picture of a user’s browsing activity, and our data are not limited to users who use Facebook.
As such, we can divide our users into treatment users, who use Facebook and are thus
subject to the algorithm shift, and control users, whose news browsing environment remains
unchanged. Using the full picture of a user’s browsing, we can observe if access to social
media leads to more news browsing or increased browsing of specific types of news, versus
merely substituting time that would have been spent browsing news from other sources.
Our data come from a subset of browsing data from a major U.S. web browser, and also a
high-quality dataset that comprises scrapes of a complete-as-possible subset of the universe
of English language news being published online since 2014. As such we have a nearlyfull picture of both the supply side and a meaningful sample of the demand side of the
online news marketplace during the course of the natural experiment. These data allow us
to confirm the effects of the natural experiment, as well as test our hypotheses regarding
the impact of social media by looking at the impact on treatment users of the diminished
Facebook news feed.
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In order to formalize our hypotheses and make sense of our data, we write down a model
of consumer news browsing, and derive expressions for a consumer’s optimal browsing level
when they have access, no access, or diminished access to social media. We formally state
our first assumption about how the change in the Facebook algorithm impacts the news
browsing experience for our users, and use our formal definitions to set up our hypotheses.
Our first hypothesis is that social media will increase overall levels of news browsing by
decreasing the time-costs of acquiring individual articles. For our second hypothesis, we
focus on opinion news content, and hypothesize that social media will yield a news diet
richer in opinion content.
We choose to focus on opinion content as a specific news topic because debate over the
prevalence of fact-based news in social media news is relevant to ongoing discussion regarding
the impact of social media on the health of the news ecosystem (see Kaplan and Haenlein
(2012), Muñoz-Torres (2012) for examples). Beyond academic interest, there is also survey
evidence that suggests Americans have strong beliefs about the relative benefits of fact-based
or opinion oriented content.6 Thus we believe focusing on this specific topic above other
potential news categories will be most beneficial to informing debate over social media.
In order to take our model to the data we must undertake three further steps. First, we
explain our exact sample selection methods to make clear the subset of users we will focus
on for analysis. Next, we explicitly state the quantities we will measure from the data
and introduce a second assumption. Using these assumptions, we show how the measured
quantities will allow us to translate this model of optimal browsing behavior to the specific
quantities in the data that we will measure empirically. These empirical measurements will
statistically test our hypotheses. We also explain the matching procedure we undertake in
order to justify our assumptions about similarity between treatment and control users.
We find that access to social media yields an increase in news browsing behavior, even after
6

Project (2018) The exact margins are 63% in favor of “news is most useful when it mostly reports facts
with some background or analysis” and only 5% in favor of “commentary or opinion” being most useful.
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accounting for potential substitution away from other forms of online news browsing. This
suggests that from a pure volume perspective, users are reading more news when they have
access to social media than they would be otherwise. Ceteris paribus, we would thus expect
users to be more informed. Perhaps more surprisingly, we also find that access to social
media decreases the amount of news that is opinion-oriented as a percentage of a users
entire news browsing diet. To be clear, this is not referring solely to news accessed via social
media, but to the user’s entire diet, meaning that overall, granting a user access to social
media would be expected to generate a news diet richer in fact-based content than if that
user continued without social media.
This latter finding runs counter to our expected conclusion and we hypothesize two reasons why this may be occurring. First, when we consider opinion-oriented news, we often
encounter long-form pieces produced by major publishing houses that are more in-depth
than typical editorial coverage. It could thus be the case that social media, in optimizing
for more short form, “bite-size” content in order to generate clicks, actually disincentivizes
opinion content due to its average length. The second reason could be that our method of
identification of opinion articles (which is URL-based) could be biased in such a way that
the type of opinion shared on social media is likely to go undetected. We discuss potential
ways to investigate both of these potential causes in our results section.
Our results imply that social media can perhaps be thought of as more salutary to the
media consumption habits of Americans than previously thought, holding constant other
concerns. Although these other concerns, such as polarization, may be legitimate and we
freely acknowledge that they may change the balance of evidence for versus against social
media, our findings are largely positive. We see increases in fact-based news browsing,
which seems to imply social media may be good for at least creating more awareness of the
facts of the world, despite perhaps having other shortcomings. For marketing managers our
results are also good news. The increase in browsing efficiency we see in news could easily
translate to other forms of content on social media, meaning the “pie” of user-attention is
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grown by social media - marketing spend on social media does not necessarily cannibalize
spend in other areas. The latter finding is a bit more difficult to interpret from a marketing
perspective, since we do not pin down an exact mechanism for why opinion content is
relatively less popular on social media. However given our surprise at the conclusion, it
perhaps serves as a caution to empirically test any hunches about what types of content
may be optimized for social media.
Section 2.2 reviews the relation of our work to prior work in this area. Section 2.3 describes
our data. Section 2.4 explains the model of consumer behavior we will use. Section 2.5
explains how we take our model to our data to test our hypotheses. Section 2.6 describes
our results and Section 2.7 concludes.

2.2. Literature Review
We are certainly not the first to notice the impact that social media has had on news
consumption habits, and we do see our results as overlapping with the considerable extant
literature on potential threats from social media news. Several strands of literature have
sprung up dealing specifically with changing news consumption habits in the era of social
media and these deserve mention. From 2009 onward, there has been considerable concern
that social media use is leading individuals to form online “echo chambers” and read only
news from sources that confirm existing biases (Sunstein (2009), Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2011), Flaxman et al. (2016) and Quattrociocchi et al. (2016)). Additionally, and especially
since the 2016 election, there has been additional concern that social media is facilitating
the spread of false or misleading “fake news” (Alcott and Gentzkow (2017), Langin (2018),
and Vosoughi et al. (2018)). In this light our work contributes to an ongoing project of
generating a comprehensive empirical taxonomy of potential benefits and hazards of social
media with respect to news.
Our work is however, not so much about the specific social media phenomena of “fake news”
or “echo chambers.” Rather, we attempt to look at the more basic characteristics of social
media as a medium, to understand more specifically how it influences what content is being
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created and consumed. Thus we look to primitive parameters of consumer preference in our
work. We are certainly not the first to attempt to do this. There is an extensive literature
attempting to document phenomena regarding consumer news-searching behavior online, as
well. More recently this topic has achieved considerable attention from computer science and
IT studies, which use surveys and experimental evidence to look at parameters of consumer
online news demand (Ha et al. (2013), Schäfer et al. (2017), Sadri (2019), Thompson et al.
(2019)). We see our research as contributing to this literature by providing a causal analysis
of a specific consumer desideratum - opinion news over social media. Future modeling of
consumer online behavior can rely on this in attempting to construct more accurate portraits
of behavior.
Finally we believe we are the first to present a rigorous causal analysis in the marketing
literature of an effect that is widely hypothesized in the popular media - that social media
use changes the way we interact with news - and to develop evidence of what kinds of changes
we should expect. We hope to contribute to a better understanding of the exact nature
and magnitude of hypothesized changes. These questions often come with public policy
implications, so better information on these topics should be helpful towards informing
better choices here.

2.3. Data
In order to address our research question, we take advantage of a unique source of data that
will allow us to leverage a natural experiment in news browsing. In this section, we explain
the source and structure of our data, as well as discuss the details of the natural experiment.
We explain how, in tandem, these can be used to identify the impact of social media on
news browsing behavior.
2.3.1. Data Sources and Structure
Article Content Data Our data come from two separate sources that can be thought of
as comprising the supply side and demand side of the news browsing environment. For the
former, we have a data store containing a daily (and hourly, in the case of major publishers)
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scrape of the websites of the 2700 largest known online English-language news publishers.
These scrapes go back to 2014, so we have a full complement of these data for the period
during which the natural experiment occurs. The list of news publishers is intended to be as
comprehensive as possible over the space of news published online. The text of the articles
are scraped, and are processed through a procedure to eliminate boilerplate text, leaving
only the “meat” of a given article for analysis.7 In addition to the text, the article URL
is saved, as well as information about the publisher. URLs are processed such that each
article has a unique “canonical” URL for identification. Further, first-stage natural language
processing tasks are performed as well to identify all unique unigrams and bigrams in the
text. Articles can be recognized across multiple iterations of the scraper, and thus articles
are not included more than a single time in the data even if they are encountered more than
once during multiple scrapes. This is an essential feature as articles are typically placed on
news homepages for a few days at a time, and can be listed under multiple non-canonical
URLs and titles.
Browsing Data While the supply-side data provide an excellent view of the space of all
news being published online, essential to our analysis is the use of what can be thought of as
demand-side data. These data comprise the browsing behavior from a subset of users from
a major U.S. web browser over the course of our observation period. Importantly, unique
users can be identified over time. This allows the construction of news browsing “sessions.”
These sessions represent sequences of news browsing that can be traced to a single source.
For example, consider a user who is browsing Facebook. While scrolling the website, she
sees her friend has shared an article from the New York Times. Our Facebook user clicks on
this article and begins to read it. Midway through reading, she sees the NYT article has, in
its text, linked a second article that interests her, so she loads that article in a second tab
and reads it as well. All this activity is grouped into a single news-browsing session which
we mark as having ultimately originated from Facebook: our logic being that the second
New York Times article would never have been read without the Facebook link to the first.
7

See the Data Appendix for more details on this and other data pipeline procedures
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If the user then went to Google and searched for the topic of the first news article, and
then clicked a third news article that came from the search results, we would have two news
browsing sessions: the one originating from Facebook comprising the first two articles, and
a second originating from Google made up of the third article. We have several methods of
classifying news browsing sessions into difference provenances that we discuss more fully in
the data appendix.
Thus what we can construct is a complete picture of a user’s news browsing activity which
gives us an idea of what a user is reading and from where the user is referred to this
information. More specifically, this means that using our data we can determine what
percentage of a user’s news diet is composed of news sourced from social media. Moreover,
we can also see the article-by-article composition of a user’s news diet, classified by source.
Changes in either can be detected by following a user over time.
2.3.2. Natural Experiment
Our ultimate research question regards the impact of social media on news browsing behavior. While a useful first step is to obtain a picture of the type of news browsing that
occurs when users get their news from social media and non-social media sources, this falls
short of a causal relationship. However, this changes if we observe a source of exogenous
variation in the ability of users to obtain news from social media. If social media were to
be removed as a source of news for some users, we would be able to determine by looking
at the subsequent shifts in their news diets, what the impact of social media was - does it
lead them to consume more content, different types of content, etc.?
We rely on such a natural experiment for our source of identifying variation. In our case,
the natural experiment that provides the basis for our analysis is the January 11, 2018
announcement by Facebook that content from friends and family would be prioritized over
content created by other parties.8 To explain how this natural experiment is useful, we
8

See Zuckerberg (2018) for official explanation. This change was announced partly in response to criticism
of Facebook’s role in the information environment during the time leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.
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require a brief digression into the mechanics of how content was served on Facebook in 2018
to illustrate how the algorithm change impacted news consumers.

Figure 2.1: Facebook Layout and Content Silos (circa 2018)
Note: News feed (default view) pointed out in red, pages pointed out in orange.

When Facebook users logged on the platform, they were taken by default to their “News
Feed.” Here is where Facebook’s algorithm curated the content they deemed most relevant
to the user, presented in a proprietary order, based on some combination of publishing date
and relevance as calculated by Facebook. The “like” function for which Facebook is famous,
was typically used by the user to interact with individual posts that appeared on the user’s
news feed. Users could see in their respective news feeds not only posts created by their
friends, but also posts that their friends had “liked”. In addition to using the “like” feature to
interact with individual posts, Facebook also had a feature called “Pages.” While individual
users interacted with Facebook by setting up a user profile, organizations (such as news
publishers) were encouraged to set up a different entity called a page. These pages were
often brands, groups of individual users, and causes. A user who chose to follow a given
page (again via a “like” action) would have that page placed in their pages directory, where
they could access content that is published by their liked pages. This was a distinct feed
from the primary news feed, and as such did not load by default. In Figure 2.1 we see a
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blurred mock-up of what a user would see when logging in to Facebook. The red arrow
indicates the news feed on the left-hand side menu, which is loaded by default. The orange
arrow indicates the location of the Pages feed. It is easy to see that in addition to not being
loaded by default, the Pages tab is far less prominent.
Prior to the January 2018 Facebook algorithm change, it was common for posts that were
made by a Page to also appear in the News Feed of a user. For a relevant example, if a
user had liked the New York Times, the Times would appear as one of that user’s Pages.
Then, content that was published to Facebook by the Times would show up on the user’s
Pages tab. However, prior to 2018, particularly popular items from a user’s pages - this is
to say articles that were seeing a lot of clicks and engagement - would also be sent to the
user’s News Feed. This would generate a higher probability of the user interacting with that
item due to increased prominence. What the algorithm change did, however, was demote
content from the News Feed that had not been engaged with by the connections of a given
user. Thus, while it was once common for a user to see popular news items being placed
in their News Feed, this was now far less common unless a first-degree connection of that
user had engaged in some way with that news item through either a comment or like. Thus,
fewer items of news were included in the news feed of users. After the algorithm change,
much more of the news content on the main page would have to come from family and
friends. Although the news is technically still available on the “Pages” feed, the prominence
was reduced and thus traffic to news sourced from Facebook fell. There could still be direct
recommendations in the case that a user chose to share an individual article, in which case
the article would show up in the news feed of the user’s connections. While the exact details
of Facebook’s algorithm remain secret, we can observe changing behavior in the data to
characterize the nature of our natural experiment.
We are not the only ones to not the impact on news publishers of this algorithm change.
As one of the primary groups affected by this change was news publishers, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the change provoked extensive coverage in the popular press. As an
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example of this we highlight a story (Bauerlein and Jeffery (2019)) by the news magazine
Mother Jones which argued for an unfair difference in impact between conservative and
liberal news outlets as a result of the change. Importantly, Mother Jones also published
their internal referral statistics indicating the magnitude of the change given in Figure 2.2.
As a news source that relied heavily on social media for distribution, we can see the large
impact this shift had on their traffic.

Figure 2.2: Referrals to Mother Jones (News Publisher) Over Time

2.3.3. Natural Experiment Verification
Although individual publishers were clearly impacted, we are interested in verifying our
natural experiment in our own data. Individual publishers are often impacted by large
idiosyncratic shifts in traffic, due for example to increased interest in political coverage
around an election season. While this certainly applies to news consumption as a whole, it
is not nearly as drastic (see for example the spike in referrals coming from the 2016 U.S.
presidential election in Figure 2.2).
In order to do this we construct a graph of referrals across all news sessions for all users
observed in our data over the time period where we believe the algorithm shift was rolled
out. In order to provide a comparison to show that news consumption stemming from
Facebook was uniquely impacted during this period (and that the change in traffic from
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Facebook was stemming from a Facebook-specific factor rather than a cross-market trend
in news consumption), we include for reference the time series of session referrals from
Google News as well as Twitter. To show this, we include Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The former
shows the weekly average news referrals originating from Twitter, Google, and Facebook to
show the marked drop in Facebook referrals as the new algorithm is rolled out, compared
to the others which remain stable. The latter graph provides another illustration of this
phenomenon, using daily data, with trendlines being made clear. These are included in
Figure 2.4 which shows that the decline of Facebook referrals across all news publishers is
quite clear relative to other sources of referrals.

Figure 2.3: Time Series of Weekly (7-day MA) Average News Referrals
Note: News sessions originating from Facebook are in blue, Twitter in gray, and Google in orange. The
y-axis indexes each referral source to a level where the first observation of each is indexed to 1.

It is important to note that there still exists an important mechanism via which posts can
be promoted into the news feed without engagement from friends and family. This is by
way of Facebook’s ad-selling platform. It is common for advertisers to pay not only for
side-bar ads on Facebook (which would be found on the right-hand column in Figure 2.1),
but also to promote posts into an individual’s feed. It is possible that news organizations
could start paying to promote their content into users’ feeds in order to maintain their reach.

61

There could be disparate impact on different publishers due to these effects, which would be
interesting to explore to characterize fully the nature of the quasi-experimental variation.
We discuss this topic in Section 2.6 It should also be noted that the prevalence of Facebook
use dwarfs the use of other social media platforms. It is thus reasonable to expect that any
change that impacts the amount of news shared on Facebook should impact the amount of
news shared on social media as a whole, and that publishers should be most sensitive to
changes from Facebook.

Figure 2.4: Time Series of Daily News Sessions by Source
Note: News sessions originating from Facebook are in blue, Twitter in gray, and Google in orange. The
y-axis indexes each referral source to a level where the first observation of each is indexed to 1.

2.4. Model
Our goal is to recover the impact of social media as a medium of news consumption on
an individual consumer’s news browsing behavior. As such, we present a model of news
consumption which includes social media as a channel of news consumption to demonstrate
formally our conception of news behavior. In this section, we present the basics of our model,
and demonstrate how the consumer’s optimal consumption decision under our model can be
used to answer our research question.
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2.4.1. Setup
We consider the set of news consumers in our data, indexed by i. Each consumer wishes to
maximize her utility at time t defined by Uit . Our utility function defining Uit takes a CobbDouglas form (similar to the model used in Athey et al. (2021)) representing a trade-off
between consumption of news and leisure:

Uit = [

Y

t αic τ
(Ni,c
) ]

tτ i

(Lti )1−τ

tτ i

(2.1)

c∈C

where individual i at time t has one unit of time that can be allocated between reading
t , as well as a quantity of leisure given by Lt . News stories have a vector
news articles Ni,c
i
Q
c of characteristics, which is a finite product set C = d=1,...,D Cd where d is the index of
t Leisure
these characteristics. Thus news consumption of type c news at time t by i is Ni,c

represents all other activities that are not time spent reading the news.
The relative preferences of an individual are defined by the parameters αic , τ i , and τ t . τ i
represents individual i’s general preference for news consumption, whereas τ t represents
a cross-population time-varying average preference for news consumption. αic represents
an individual-specific, time-invariant preference for consuming specific categories of news
content. In accordance with the Cobb-Douglas framework, we assume the product τ t τ i ∈
[0, 1], which allows for any amount of i’s day to be spent reading news from none to all.
The key implications of this functional form are that first a user’s share of time spent reading
the news can be thus be decomposed into a date effect and a person effect via τ i and τ t .
Examples motivating differences in these parameters may serve to provide further clarity.
It is obvious that different individuals have different levels of interest in news topics and
thus different preferences over time given to the news, which we see as variation in τ i .
Additionally, it is also clear that certain periods of time have more appealing news than
others, be it the day of the Superbowl driving sports news demand or an election year
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creating demand for political news. These demand differences would show up as variation
over τ t .
Moreover, it is also easy to imagine differences in types of news given by variation in αic
parameters - some prefer sports, others politics. What is important to note, however is that
a utility-maximizing individual will consume a constant share of news of a particular type,
so long as the costs of finding different types of news do not change. Further, it is these costs
of obtaining news that we must define in order to solve the model and test our hypotheses.
We define the quantity πc to be the number of articles of type c that a user can read with
1 unit of time. This will allow us to take our model to the data, as we will only be able to
observe articles consumed, rather than consumer time spent. Further, we introduce social
media as a news consumption technology to define:

πc = π̃c + π̃cSo

(2.2)

where now πc is a quantity composed of the number of articles that can obtained via social
media (π̃cSo ) and those obtained through other online sources (π̃c ). This quantity essentially
represents the “price” of news in terms of the leisure that must be sacrificed to obtain it.
Moreover, this also defines our thinking about social media technology as a channel for news
consumption that can enhance a user’s ability to consume news, but whose cost-reduction
benefits may not be uniform across different types of news c.
Using this quantity, we can now derive consumer i’s optimal solutions when the user does
not and does have access to social media (equations in order respectively):

t
Ñi,c
= τ i τ t αic π̃c

(2.3)

t
Ni,c
= τ i τ t αic πc

(2.4)

and
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where πc and π̃c are defined in equation 2.2: πc is a composite of non-social news - π̃c - and
socially-sourced news. As such we now have an expression translating consumer preferences
into the quantities of news consumption we see in our data via consumer optimization
behavior. In our next discussion section, we define our testable hypotheses formally in
terms of this model, and discuss how these hypotheses will fit our natural experiment.
2.4.2. Formal Hypotheses and Discussion
In order to show how our model can be used to test our specific hypotheses, we will for
clarity present a simplified version of the model showing choice over only two types of news
content. We choose opinion and factual content for this purpose where now C := {f, o}. the
vector of content characteristics is now composed of two type dummies, f for factual news
and o for opinion news. This yields:

t αif
t αio τ
Uit = [(Nif
) (Nio
) ]

tτ i

(Lti )1−τ

tτ i

(2.5)

here we have merely removed the product term and replaced its two components, sub scripted
by their types f and o. This allows us to see clearly our two hypotheses: the first (volume)
hypothesis is that social media will increase the amount of news that individuals read as
a whole via a reduction in cost in obtaining one or more types of news content. Formally,
the corresponding null hypothesis (that social media technology produces no change) can
be written as:

Ho1 :

X

πc =

c

X

π̃c

(2.6)

c

where this implies that the costs of obtaining news across all content types are identical for
users with and without social media technology, and thus the amount of news remains the
same.
Our second hypothesis governs whether social media’s cost reductions are spread unevenly
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through different content types. It is here we take advantage of simplifying into only two
content types to illustrate. Using opinion news, we hypothesize that social media will
decrease the cost of obtaining opinion type content more so than it decreases the cost of
obtaining factual news content. The corresponding null hypothesis can be written as:

Ho2 :

π̃o
πo
=
πo + πf
π̃o + π̃f

(2.7)

where here we see that the ratio of costs of opinion content to all other content is the same
under the regime with no access to social media as the regime in which content can be
accessed via social media.9
One issue that we must deal with explicitly is that in our natural experiment described in
Section 2.3, social media is not shut down as a source of news but instead impaired. As
such, we define a third cost quantity: π̃cSo ′ . This quantity represents the cost of obtaining
news via social media when Facebook is impaired, and not shut down in some way. We then
define the corresponding aggregate news price as:
′

π̃c′ = π˜c + π̃cSo

Recalling that the units of our π primitives are given as a number of articles that can be
browsed in a given unit of time, we formally state our first assumption:
Assumption 1: πc ≥ π̃c′ ≥ π̃c
which formally states that the per-unit-time rate of acquiring news with the aid of social
media technology (πc ) must be strictly greater than that acquiring news without using the
technology (π̃c ) - as the choice to not use social media remains for all news-seekers who
have access to this technology. Further the assumption states that the per-unit-time rate
9

Note that this test can be expanded for more than two content types where we would need n-1 hypotheses
to test n content types.
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of acquiring news with impaired-algorithm social media (π̃c′ ) must lie somewhere between
these former two quantities. As such, when we take our hypotheses to the data, we will
substitute the relevant π̃ ′ parameters for π̃ parameters. Glancing at equations (2.6) and (2.7)
in combination with the above inequality implies that any statistically significant evidence
rejecting the null hypothesis for π̃ ′ would imply the null is rejected for π̃. As such we will
now explain how these quantities are measured empirically so as to test these hypotheses.

2.5. Empirical Framework
In this section we discuss how we apply our model from Section 2.4 to the natural experiment
and data described in Section 2.3 to answer our research question. We first discuss how we
select our final sample of users. Then we discuss the matching procedure we undertake to
pair users for analysis. Finally, we explain the exact quantities we estimate from the data
and how they correspond to the hypotheses we lay out in Section 2.4.
2.5.1. Sample Selection
We focus on only a subset of users for our analysis. We are only interested in active users
that browse news both before and after the Facebook algorithm change such that a change
in behavior may be detected. As such, we keep only users with activity in every week of our
data. One of the challenges of our analysis is selecting an appropriate “before” and “after”
period during which to compare user behavior. As we can see from Figure 2.3, the algorithm
is only changed steadily over time, so there is no clear treatment date. Our aim is to get
at least thirty days of data in each period as we want a sufficient amount of time such that
short-term fluctuations in browsing can be averaged out. However, we don’t want any part
of our data to overlap with the roll-out of the new algorithm as we want a stable level of
social media access for all users.
We choose two months of data as close to the algorithm shift as we can get, but with none
overlapping the shift itself. This yields us October 19, 2017 - November 17, 2017 as our
“before” period, and March 19, 2018 - April 17, 2018 as our “after” period. The interim
period is referred to as the “adjustment” period wherein the algorithm change takes place
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and users adapt their news browsing behavior to their new news yields. This is detailed in
Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Stylized Illustration of Facebook User News Browsing in the Before- and AfterAlgorithm Shift Periods.

To get our final sample, we introduce three filters, location, total activity, and regular
activity. For location, we require that our users be U.S.-based, since this is the domain of
the publishers we focus on. For total activity, we require that our users have at least 30
browsing sessions in each period - on average one per day. For regular activity we ensure
that our selected users have at least one session per week in the data. Our goal is to focus
only on relatively active news consumers and avoid those that won’t be affected by social
media as they aren’t regular news consumers.
We define treatment users to be those that accessed Facebook at any point during their
presence in our data. Control users are those that don’t use Facebook. Since the algorithm
shift is restricted only to Facebook, only those users who use Facebook to obtain use will be
impacted by the shift, thus receiving the treatment. With our sample in hand, we proceed
to our hypothesis testing framework.
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2.5.2. Quasi-Experimental Analysis
Our aim is to test the hypotheses listed in equations (2.6) and (2.7). In order to do so, we
will proceed via use of a matching framework wherein each treatment user is paired with
the control user who has the most similar possible browsing appetite. Then, differences in
browsing observed in our users can be assumed to stem from the impact of the treatment.
Formally, our goal in matching is to realistically implement what will be our identifying
assumption, that the paired treatment and control users have identical optimal levels of
news consumption during the matching period. More formally for treatment user i and
matched control user î we have:
Assumption 2 : ∀c, τ i αic π̃c′ = τ î αîc π̃c
what this assumption says is that for all content types c, the paired treatment and control
users will consume the same amount of content when the treatment user has algorithmimpaired social media and the control user has no access to social media. What this does
not assume is that treatment and control users have identical preference parameters. We
do not make this stronger assumption for two reasons: First, we are not capable of making
such an assumption even if we wanted to, because the algorithm change in Facebook is
not a complete shutdown of the technology, but merely an impairment in a user’s ability
to efficiently obtain news content on the platform. As such, we are unable to observe
treatment and control users in a period in which they have access to identical levels of
news browsing technology. While we can identify identical content consumption levels up to
the cost difference between algorithm-impaired Facebook and no Facebook, the individual
preference parameters are not identified. Second, however, we do not need an assumption
of this strength, as we are able to combine assumption A2 with assumption A1 to test our
hypothesis. We will now explain formally how we take this approach to the data.
To be explicit and clear about this, we will restrict our matching procedure to the period
after the Facebook algorithm change. It is important to note that the matching is done
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on the individual’s browsing after the adjustment period is over. This can seem counterintuitive, as it is typically the case that matching occurs on the pre-treatment behavior.
However, our design is not like typical treatments where something is added, like an extra
year of schooling, for example. Rather, in our case, our treatment is taking away an existing
tool (Facebook) that individuals were using to access news. Thus, in order to use as strong
as possible a revealed-preferences argument to identify users with near-identical preferences,
we would need to examine a period when users have access to the as-similar-as-possible news
search technology. After the treatment date, both treatment and control users have more
similar technology than before, per assumption A1. As such, we use browsing behavior after
the algorithm change and subsequent adjustment period as our basis for matching highly
similar users.
We will observe the following quantities in the data:

X

newsic −

c

X

newsîc

(2.8)

c

and
newsîc′
newsic′
−P
∀c′ ∈ C where c′ ̸= c∗ P
c newsic
c newsîc

(2.9)

here newsic is the number of article clicks from user i on content type c. Equation (2.8) is
the difference in the total volume of news consumed by the treatment user i and the control
user î. Equation (2.9) is the difference in the percentage of news of content type c consumed
by treatment user i and corresponding control user î. As was discussed in Section 2.4, we
do not measure the described difference for a single content type c∗ , as the difference for c∗
is identified by the differences in the remaining content types.
Now, in order to explain how these quantities will test our hypotheses, we rewrite them in
terms of our model’s solutions:
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X

τ t τ i αic πc −

X

τ t τ î αîc π̃c

(2.10)

c

c

and
τ t τ î αîc′ π̃c′
τ t τ i αic′ πc′
∀c′ ∈ C where c′ ̸= c∗ P t i
−P
t î
c τ τ αic πc
c τ τ αîc π̃c

(2.11)

where now we see equation (2.8) corresponds to equation (2.10) and equation (2.9) corresponds to equation (2.11), where in the latter equations the values are taken from the
optimal solutions described in equations (2.4) and (2.3).
Under our assumptions A1 and A2, we have that Ho1 implies equation (2.8) equals zero,
and Ho2 implies equation (2.9) is equal to zero. Finding evidence that these quantities are
nonzero in our sample would allow us to reject these null hypotheses.
2.5.3. Identification of News Characteristics
Identifying opinion articles is the next stage of the data construction. Taking a conservative
approach, we choose to only use articles that are expressly marked as opinion, editorial, or
identified as being written by a columnist by the publishing news organization - i.e. this label
is present in the URL. This means that it is possible that we will miss out on quasi-opinion
content that takes a strong editorial or narrative tone while reporting the news, if these
websites are not explicitly marketed as opinion. Identifying and classifying opinion content
of this sort is potentially an extension to this work, but also introduces difficulties wherein
content no longer sits on a binary scale, but must be placed on a continuum between total
opinion and purely factual content. We discuss potential impact our classification procedure
may have on our results in Section 2.6.
2.5.4. Matching
Although we have described formally in Subsection 2.5.2 the relationship between matched
user pairs, we must describe how we perform our matching in order to justify Assumption
A2.
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We choose the random serial dictatorship algorithm to conduct matching. The manner in
which this algorithm proceeds is the following: first, we select important metrics on which
we will match users. For our purposes we use three behavioral metrics, (1) total browsing
clicks, (2) news browsing clicks, and (3) opinion clicks.
We then calculate for each variable the empirical distribution among all users in the sample
over the matching period (after the algorithm shift has occurred and the adjustment period
is finished). Each active user is then given a percentile rank over each of the variables’
distributions. The distance metric we use to determine the difference between two active
users is the equally-weighted average of the squared difference in percentile across each
variable. The matching algorithm then proceeds as follows: the order of the individual
treatment users is first randomized, and then the minimum-distance control user is selected
for each treatment user in this random order, without replacement. Thus, each treatment
user is matched with the minimum-distance control user from among the remaining control
users. This proceeds until either treatment or control users are exhausted and the remaining
users are discarded. In order to ensure that our matching is done in a reasonable amount
of time, we do not calculate the distance between every treatment/control user pair. Since
we have > 400 thousand treatment users, this would result in over 100 billion calculations
for each variable. In order to keep this manageable, we introduce a caliper on a user’s total
browsing clicks, and only calculate the distances for the remaining variables for control users
within 5% on this variable.

2.6. Results
2.6.1. Matching Results
We first examine the results of our matching procedure. Using our activity filters, we isolate
1.2 million users who fit our activity criteria and are active during the before and after
periods. Of these users, 416,668 use Facebook, which means these make up our potential
pool of treatment users and the remainder are potential control users. We reject any user
match which contains an empirical cdf gap of greater than 10%, but fortunately even after

72

this cleaning step, we are able to find acceptable matches for all our treatment users out
of our potential pool of control users. In Table 2.1 we can see these results illustrated by
summary statistics from the treatment and control users.
We also include Figure 2.6 to demonstrate the full picture of treatment and control user’s
different sources of news. We can see from this chart that the main difference between
the two is Facebook, which is exactly as we intended. Twitter represents a relatively small
percentage of both user’s news sources, but is roughly doubly represented among treatment
users. Google news is somewhat more important to control users, but this makes sense in
that the percentage of news coming from Facebook must necessarily come from elsewhere
for control users as they don’t use Facebook.
As we can see, the matching is quite good, with near identical distributions of activity
metrics across the treatment and control groups for the matching statistics. 95% of our
matched users have a distance score (defined as the sum of squared percentile differences
across all three matching variables) of less than 0.04. For all matching variables, treatment
and control group means are within 10% of one another.
Table 2.1: Statistics of Final Mover Sample

Statistic

Treatment/Control

Observations
Observations
Mean
Mean
Median
Median
Min
Min
Max
Max

Treatment
Control
Treatment
Control
Treatment
Control
Treatment
Control
Treatment
Control

Total Pageviews

News Views

Opinion Views

416,668
416,668
2,559
2,804
1,922
2,187
8
8
65,463
49,875

416,668
416,668
349.2
338.2
186.0
172.0
8.0
8.0
30,158.0
42,222.0

416,668
416,668
1.963
1.951
0
0
0
0
733
722

Summary statistics are listed for total observations mean, median, min, and max for three variables across
treatment and control users. Variables are defined as follows: Total Pageviews is equivalent to the total
amount of browsing undertaken by a user in the matching period measured as a number of page views.
Article views represents the total amount of that browsing that corresponds to news produced by one of
our 2700 English-language publishers. Opinion views represents the news clicks that we categorize as being
opinion-oriented news content using the procedure described in Section 2.5
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(a) Treatment User News Session Sources

(b) Control User News Session Sources

Figure 2.6: Treatment/Control User News Sources

2.6.2. Changes in User Browsing Behavior
The first step in determining whether our assumptions hold is to examine the empirical effect
of the Facebook algorithm change. We should see a decrease in Facebook use among the
treatment group of Facebook users after the date of the algorithm change. This is indeed
the case as is evident in Figure 2.7.
Indeed, in our sample, between the average amount of news sessions sourced from Facebook
seen prior to the algorithm change, and the average amount of news sessions sourced from
Facebook observed after our adjustment period, the use of Facebook as a source of news
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Figure 2.7: Daily Averaged Facebook News Sessions Among Treatment Users
Note: The x-axis is the date the activity occurred and the y-axis represents the average number of
sessions originating from Facebook for treatment users. The vertical dotted line represents the algorithm
change announcement.

has declined by 24%. We would not expect users to stop using Facebook altogether, since
the algorithm change won’t alter a daily propensity to check Facebook for other reasons,
such as status updates from friends and relatives, and indeed we see that the total number
of Facebook views only declines by about 6%. What we observe is consistent with users
continuing to use Facebook as before, but being exposed to much less news content when
they are there. Facebook as an organization indeed predicted this as an outcome in their
announcement of the algorithm shift.
Next, we want to examine the impact in news sessions on average in the before and after
period. Figure 2.8 shows the average number of news sessions in the before and after period
for both treatment and control users.
We examine the news sessions for the periods before and after the algorithm change for the

75

Figure 2.8: Before/After News Session Totals Changes
Note: Represents the average number of news sessions sourced from Facebook and from all other social
media sources before the algorithm change and after the adjustment period.

treatment and control groups. We can see here that while the control group actually consumes somewhat more news from social media in the period after the change, the treatment
group of Facebook users experiences a small drop in social media news sessions. This implies
that engagement with news via Facebook decreases for the treatment group in the way we
would expect, relative to overall news browsing behavior. Moreover, in Figure 2.9, we can
see that while the number of sessions sourced from other forms of social media (Twitter,
Instagram, etc.) for the treatment group increases roughly in line with that of the control
group in Figure 2.8, we also have a nearly 20% drop in Facebook news sessions.
2.6.3. Hypothesis Testing
Last, we now turn our attention to the results testing our hypotheses laid out in Section
2.5.2. The first hypothesis is the overall news volume consumption effect. If Facebook is
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Figure 2.9: Treatment News Source Changes
Note: Initial levels indexed to 1. Represents the average number of news sessions sourced from Facebook
and from all other social media sources before the algorithm change and after the adjustment period.

changing its news algorithm such that less news is consumed over Facebook, we would be
interested to know the degree to which substitution is taking place via other technologies.
If consumers have inelastic demand for news, then we would expect to see a large degree of
substitution. Under our assumption that matched users’ preferences are identical, we can
see in Table 2.2 that indeed the effect of social media access is increased news consumption
- the average user reads roughly 14 additional articles than they otherwise would. The
matched pairs indicate that treated users consume more news when they have access to
more Facebook news via an unimpaired news feed. This makes sense at a basic level, given
the arguments laid out about the increasing importance of social media as a technology used
for news consumption, and indeed it is what we see in the data.
The impact of news readership on opinion content is also seen in Table 2.2 as Hypothesis
2. We can see that social media use is associated with a 5 basis point decrease in opinion77

Table 2.2: Results of Hypothesis Tests

Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 2

Test-Statistic

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

N

14.39
-0.05%

0.3493
0.0031%

41.19
-16.86

0.0000
0.0000

416,668
416,668

Table shows results for a one sample t-test of the null hypothesis that the test statistic is equal to zero.
Hypothesis 1 corresponds to the quantity described in (2.8), while Hypothesis 2 corresponds to the
quantity described in (2.9). P-values are given for a two-tailed t-test.

oriented content. Given opinion content is relatively rare, this actually corresponds to a
roughly 5% decline in the percentage of content that is opinion. This result is somewhat
surprising First, it must be said that the sign of the result indicates that the percentage
of news content consumed via Facebook is smaller than the percentage of news content
consumed overall. This is the opposite of our initial thinking, but the result is statistically
significant and indicates a real trend.
2.6.4. Discussion
The finding that social media access increases overall news consumption is an important one.
Whatever its other impacts, social media does appear to be increasing the amount of news
consumed by users. Individuals are not merely substituting away from other news sources
in our data, but are instead browsing more news overall when they have access to social
media as a news browsing technology. This appears to be a case of technology creating an
environment where information acquisition is “cheaper” in a time sense than it had been
earlier.
What is less clear is the mechanism through which this is occurring. It could be the case
for example that use of social media simply increases the amount of time an individual
spends in a news-rich environment - socialization time now doubling as a venue for news
browsing. News is now competing for attention and potentially crowding out time that
had previously been used for other purposes. In this case, the potential welfare effects
are unclear, depending whether the additional news content is seen as a distraction or a
welcome diversion. Another mechanism that presents social media in a more favorable
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light would be one of greater efficiency in content delivery. In this latter case, a user’s
news feed is a more personalized forum for article delivery than other online routes such
as aggregators or publisher homepages. Under this regime, the user now spends less time
searching for appealing articles per unit of time reading the news. This latter mechanism
also has potential downsides as it may create more potential for the echo chambers discussed
in Section 2.2.
Our result regarding the opinion content of social media content is relatively more surprising
given our expectations. What this result indicates is that social media creates a more factrich news diet than otherwise would be the case in social media. This is even more surprising
when we consider our specific natural experiment - our comparison is between treatment
and control users when the treatment is an “unimpaired” social media algorithm and the
baseline is the post-algorithm-shift news diet. This means that Facebook’s algorithm prior
to the news feed change was relatively richer in fact-based content than the algorithm after
the change. One potential concern in this design is that Facebook targeted specific types of
content in the news feed rather than simply throttling news consumption overall. However,
if this were the case, it would be strange that they decreased fact-based content more so
than opinion news. This factor makes the evidence stronger in our view that social media
news content is relatively more fact based.
Although fact-based news tends to have a better reputation among the public as we pointed
out in our introduction, we consider two mechanism that may temper our enthusiasm for
this conclusion. First, when one considers opinion news, it often encompasses long-form
pieces produced by major publishing houses that require more reading time than typical
editorial content. Social media (and the algorithms behind the news feed specifically) is
often optimizing for total number of engagements or clicks. As such, it could be the case
that relatively shorter or more “bite-size” pieces of content are promoted more heavily than
long-form content, and opinion thus suffers. Another somewhat related reason why this
may be occurring is that our identification of opinion content (which is URL-based) could
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be imbalanced in the sense that it is more likely to detect opinion content from certain
types of publishers versus others. Consider the case where we have a class of high-quality
publishers who fastidiously label their opinion content as such, and a class of low-quality
publishers who freely mix fact based and editorial content. If social media news promotes
lower quality news overall, then it would appear as if social media diets were relatively more
fact-based as they would simply be eliminating the opinion articles we are able to observe.
We propose several methods of distinguishing from these mechanisms. The first method
would be an attempt to distinguish the mechanism of social media news’ increased volume
effect. We consider the proposed mechanism that social media is increasing news volume
by providing more articles of the exact type a user wants to see, at the exclusion of a more
diverse set of news. In this case, we would focus on political news both as an expedient
area to test the mechanism, and because it is directly related to popular concerns about
echo chambers. Suppose we are able to rate the partisanship of articles. If we can do this,
then we could see what a user’s preferred level of partisanship is, as well as a metric for the
partisan diversity of their news diet - how often the read the other side of the story. If social
media were increasing volume due to targeting user’s specific preferences, than we would
expect this diversity metric to decrease when a user has better access to social media, as the
volume effect increase would be concentrated in the user’s preferred level of partisanship.
This would also test claims about the echo-chamber effect in social media directly.
In the case of opinion content, we would like to investigate both potential mechanisms for
our opinion effect. For the former hypothesis, that social media optimizes for article length
to the disadvantage of longer-form opinion pieces, we would like to take advantage of our
article supply-side data and begin investigating the differential impact of social media on
articles of different length. If it turns out that social media does indeed decrease the length
of the average article read, and opinion articles are longer on average, this would confirm
this hypothesis.
For the latter hypothesized mechanism, that opinion articles are more accurately counted
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in publications that are relatively less popular on social media, we would like to look at
the impact of social media on different categories of publishers. We can determine the
percentage of opinion articles produced by each publisher in our data using our method,
and then decompose the decrease in opinion browsing due to social media into within- and
between-publisher effects. A large between-publisher effect would be consistent with our
second mechanism wherein social media is merely causing individuals to substitute away
from certain publishers, and may thus be causing us to miss large amounts of opinion
content. A within-publisher shift away from opinion content would exonerate social media
of this specific mechanism. Breaking down the volume effect by publisher would also show
us which types of publisher (large or small, partisan or nonpartisan, etc.) benefit most from
the introduction of social media technology which would be of general interest.

2.7. Conclusion
Ultimately, we find that our hypothesis of an increased volume effect due to social media is
confirmed, while we find the share of opinion news to be the opposite of what we expect.
While we discuss the potential reasons for these findings and ways to test them in Section
2.6, we will also mention briefly some implications of these findings.
To begin, our results indicate that social media may have a salutary effect on the news
consumption behavior of users, which is a finding that runs counter to many claims in the
popular press and in academic work. Although we certainly do not believe we are taking a
fully holistic picture of social media’s impact on society, at least in the realm of delivering
fact-based news content, it seems to be beneficial. A brief note should be made about the
marketing implications of this work. First, a considerable proportion of online advertising
spend is directed towards social media advertising. Understanding how consumers behave
when on social media versus other types of browsing is extremely important to developing
theories of consumer behavior that could guide such advertising. Knowing what types of
news content obtain consumer attention is a step in this direction. If advertising agencies
dedicate increasing portions of their budgets into online advertising, the behavior of con-
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sumers when using social media is of paramount interest. As such, our work, especially that
on potential mechanisms, may shed light on how consumers engage with social media in
ways that could be beneficial to those interested in optimizing the content they produce for
social media. News acquisition behavior can provide insight into how these processes work
when consumers choose to obtain information about products and services.
Last, media is itself an important industry. Although we think this paper presents conclusions that are relevant beyond a single industry, the conclusions this paper produces are
deeply relevant to media producers. Decisions on how to staff journalists for both opinion
and non-opinion news as well as decisions on how to appropriately market content, should
incorporate the insights gained from these results.
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APPENDIX
Chapter One Estimation Details
A.1. Estimation
Estimating our model encounters challenges in dealing with its size, as well as the number
of individual parameters that are to be estimated. Although the basic setup is a familiar
multinomial logit framework, each individual has 288 decision sets per day, which over the
whole data set means 459,389,952 decisions across all users. Fitting the entire data set
into memory becomes impractical. As the number of parameters scales with the number of
users, we additionally encounter issues with any optimization procedure that requires the
computation of the Hessian matrix. We lay out our estimation procedure to exploit the
structure of our data to overcome these issues.
First, recall θ from Section 1.5 is the vector of all of our model’s parameters

θ ′ = [β10 , β11 , , β12 , ..., βn0 , βn1 , βn2 , {θ}]

where the vector θ is of size (3n + k) x 1 where n is the total number of users in the data
and k is the number of θ parameters to estimate, from 1 (for the whole population) to n
(individual θi for each user). Also recall the log-likelihood function:
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LL(θ) =
I X
J X
T
X

I(yit = j)I(yit ̸= 0)

i=1 j=0 t=1

log{

exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )
}
P
exp(βi1 θvc(i)t + βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 ) + Jj=1 exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )

+ I(yit = 0) log{

exp(βi1 θvc(i)t + βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 )
}
P
exp(βi1 θvc(i)t + βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 ) + Jj=1 exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )

(A.1)

In the above equation, yit is the choice of user i at time t. Note that the outside option is
indexed to choice j = 0, and the J news publishers are indexed as j = 1, ..., J. Here we
can observe the fact that there is only one shared parameter between the users, θ. It is thus
possible to separate the likelihood function into individual likelihoods as such:

LL(θ) =

I
X

ll(θi , θ)

(A.2)

i=1

where θi = [βi0 , βi1 , βi2 ] and

ll(θi , θ) =
J X
T
X

I(yit = j)I(yit ̸= 0)

j=0 t=1

exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )
log{
}
P
exp(βi1 θvc(i)t + βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 ) Jj=1 exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )
+ I(yit = 0) log{

exp(βi1 θvc(i)t + βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 )
}
P
exp(βi1 θvc(i)t + βi2 (θvc(i)t )2 ) + Jj=1 exp(βi0 + βi1 xj + βi2 x2j )

(A.3)

We may now break the problem up by user and estimate Equation A.3 for each user, avoiding
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any memory constraints or issues with large numbers of parameters. However, this can only
be achieved by taking θ as given for each consumer optimization problem. We choose to
perform a grid search procedure over θ values for each user. A value for θ is selected and
then the optimization problem in Equation A.3 is solved given the selected value of θ.
The resulting θ̂i parameters that maximize the log-likelihood, as well as the resulting loglikelihood value are saved after each grid search iteration. As such, selecting the likelihoodmaximizing value of θ simply means summing these individual log-likelihood values for each
value of θ used in the grid search, and then selecting the one with the maximum total loglikelihood. The β̂i parameters in θ̂ are then just the parameters in the saved θ̂i estimates
that correspond for the estimated θ̂.
Splitting the likelihood maximization problem up by user also allows two effective avenues
for further optimization of the computation. The first is that as the individual user-level
grid searches are completely independent, we are able to parallelize the processing of the
problem across multiple cores in an efficient manner. Second, the eventual β̂ estimates do
not change significantly for small changes in θ. Thus for each iteration of the grid search,
we are able to use the solution β̂ values from the previous iteration as a starting point. This
effectively reduces the total number of likelihood function calls within the optimizer by 80%.
While it is possible to compute analytical standard errors for our parameters, this approach
immediately encounters two problems. First, while the computation of the derivatives of
the log likelihood function laid out in Equation A.1 for each parameter are straightforward,
the large number of parameters makes the procedure quite tedious. To deal with this, we
first note that the standard errors for the individual β̂ values can be computed analytically
at the individual level requiring only a 3x3 Hessian. Since these values are computed using
our eventual maximum likelihood estimate of θ̂, they are valid. As such, analytical standard
errors for each individual user’s β parameters can be computed and we have thus we have
obtained estimates for all but one of our parameters.
For our remaining parameter, we choose to compute our standard errors for our estimate of θ
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using a standard bootstrap. Since our model in Section 1.2 implies that choices independent
across and within users, we are able to simply select randomly at the user level to obtain
bootstrap samples.
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APPENDIX
Chapter Two Data Appendix
B.1. Data
We discuss the processing of the subset of browsing data that was available to us. These
data are originally stored as a series of URL requests. What these entail are a series of URLs
that an individual user has browsed, as well as a time stamp, the user’s dwell time, and the
URL of the referring article.
The first stage of processing is to transform these raw search logs into daily processed
activity logs. The main goal of this processing is to identify the subset of browsing rows
that are relevant to our project, as well as to generate resultant data structures composed of
these relevant rows and users’ anonymized data. Further, processing allows us to extract and
assemble relevant metadata that can be inferred from the relative positions of these browsing
rows. The supply-side data is particularly useful for us here, as it enables us to recognize
which URLs in the raw browsing data are relevant. From the supply side, we can obtain a
list of publishers, as well as a list of known “landing pages.” The latter are addresses in a
particular publisher’s domain that are not in themselves articles, but are rather collections
of links. “www.nytimes.com/opinion” would for example, be a landing page. Although we
do not in this paper concern ourselves with potential use of landing pages as sources of
information (see Athey, Mobius, & Pal for a model including the reading of headlines on a
landing page as browsing), it is necessary to distinguish them from articles so that we can
focus our analysis on the articles themselves.
With the list of publishers we have obtained from our supply-side scraping, we can begin
to assemble the browsing data into our objects of interest, news minisessions. Although the
raw data have session identification information that indicates whether a string of URLs
was accessed during a single use of the web browser, we are interested in subdividing these
sessions into what we term minisessions. We do this for two primary reasons: first, while
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there is significant capacity for data storage, working with these datasets puts system memory under considerable strain, so eliminating any unnecessary data on browsing that is not
relevant to our research interests is necessary. Thus, minisessions contain only the browsing
data for URLs that fall into a domain of one of our known news publishers. In order to keep
a minimum amount of information on other browsing that may be relevant in the future, we
also save the domains a user has accessed, as well as the number of times accessed by day
in separate datastore that encompasses all domains, news or otherwise. This is useful for
our particular project as it allows us to know if and how often a user uses Facebook, even if
Facebook is not used in news minisessions. Data are also compressed such that publishers,
landing pages, and articles are kept in a single lookup hash table, and individual browsing
data only requires saving a reference to the given hash table. For example, the canonical
URL of an article is saved in a single lookup, and references to this URL in the browsing of
users are simply saved as references to compress storage. The second reason we construct
the news minisessions is that we wish to understand the sourcing of news browsing activity.
A user may have a browser open for days on end, which would only provide us with a single
entry point for many URLs. We implement a 90 minute rule, wherein browsing is broken
into a new constructed minisession after 90 minutes have passed since the last page was
accessed.
The procedure to construct the minisessions is rather straightforward. We order an individual’s URLs by time, and then use the session identifiers provided in the raw browsing logs to
break them up into initial sessions. After constructing the aformentioned domain store, we
then remove all sessions that do not contain news browsing information. We then process
each row into a data structure known as a meta request, which contains the raw request
information (URL, dwell time, time and date, and raw log referrer) as well as minor meta
processing details such as the canonical URL corresponding to the browsing row’s article
or landing page. Each session is then stored as a simple list of meta-request objects. The
processor then goes through a procedure of augmenting the existing information we have on
the referrer. Although the raw logs provide a basic idea of what the referring web page was,
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we wish to enrich this by walking back through the browsing rows in order to determine
which page a click came from. We walk backward through the browsing rows and identify
if a given row comes after a previous row from the same publisher. If that previous row is
a landing page, and the events occur within 90 minutes of one another, we can reasonably
infer that the previous row was the source. With our reference information, we can create browsing “trees.” Due to tabbed browsing, page references do not operate on a linear
basis, so we need construct these via recursion. Using our reference information, we place
our browsing rows into trees wherein each browsing row can be thought of as a node - all
browsing rows that reference that prior node would be child nodes.
Thus we now have these tree structures that represent partitioned browsing sessions. The last
step to process them into our minisessions is to transform the nodes into browser rows with
all the aforementioned data, as well as determine an entry point. This latter processing step
is extremely important as it allows for our analysis of where news browsing is coming from.
For social media-sourced or search-sourced news, this process is relatively straightforward
as we compare the initial referring URL to a list of known social media or search provider
domains. We also check for email-sourced news articles in a similar manner. We also perform
a step of post-processing to ensure that our article clicks are not artificially inflated by the
slideshows that are now common in certain corners of the Internet. In order to do this, we
examine URLs to find URLs that are identical up to a single character. Slideshows typically
follow this convention up to a slide number. When this is the case, all slideshow URLs in the
given series are marked as such, and are considered distinct from articles. Thus, at the end
of this procedure, our data are stored as daily lists of users and their browsing information,
the latter of which consists as domains accessed and news browsing minisessions. Each day
also contains the previously mentioned lookup lists that house the hash tables to store article
and publisher names as text. This enables individual days of browsing data to be saved.
After combining our processed raw data into a single data store, we can begin the analysis
detailed in Sections 2.5.4 and 2.5.2.
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